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An introductory summary
The seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced a new line
of thought in finance research. Since then many papers analyze economic
choices based on assumptions that depart from perfect rationality. Some of
these assumptions are based on research in psychology and neuroscience and
are helpful in explaining many aspects of economic decision making. In partic-
ular, this field of research analyzes how cognitive biases can impact individual
behavior.1 This thesis investigates the effect of managerial biases on corporate
financial policies. It consists of three essays analyzing empirically the effect of
managerial optimism on debt contract design and corporate payout policy as
well as the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate speculation with
derivatives.
The concept of optimism emerged from research in psychology and refers
to the so-called "better-than-average" phenomenon that describes that individ-
uals are prone to overestimate their abilities relative to others. Svenson (1981),
for example, documents how individuals overestimate their driving skill and
shows that a majority of people interviewed believe they are better than the
average driver. Optimism has been found to be particularly prevalent among
corporate executives.2 This finding may originate from the fact that an execu-
tive’s performance is difficult to evaluate, that executives are highly committed
to their tasks and believe that they are able to control their companies’ success.
Research in finance and economics started to analyze the concept of op-
timism in the 1980s. Roll (1986) shows how managerial optimism can drive
corporate takeover activity where bidding firms pay too much for target firms.
More recently, a number of studies documents a relation between manage-
1 Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Baker and Wurgler (2012) provide excellent overviews
over this research area.
2 See Kidd (1970), Larwood and Whittaker (1977), and Moore (1977) for evidence of opti-
mism among managers.
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rial optimism and corporate financial policies empirically.3 These studies use
executive compensation information to examine whether a specific manager is
optimistic or rational. A manager who is optimistic and overestimates his abil-
ities will also overestimate his firm’s future expected cash flow which makes
him believe that his firm is undervalued. Malmendier and Tate (2005) use
this idea and identify managers as optimistic if they ever hold executive stock
options until one year prior to maturity even though these options are deep in
the money. The rationale is that managers who typically have a large fraction
of personal wealth tied to their company and only limited diversification abil-
ities across alternative investments should rationally exercise an option once
it is in the money and exercisable. Only executives who are extremely op-
timistic about their firm’s future return would decide not to do so in these
situations. Classifying executives into optimistic and rational requires there-
fore information about an executive’s option portfolio. In this dissertation,
this information is taken from ExecuComp (chapter 1 and 3) or is hand col-
lected from firms’ proxy statements (chapter 2) for the companies’ CEOs and
CFOs. The classification is described in more detail in the Appendix. In the
following, the three essays included in the thesis are summarized.
The first paper (with Tim R. Adam, Tobias Scheinert, and Daniel Stre-
itz) investigates the impact of managerial optimism on debt contract design.
The analysis focuses on performance-sensitive debt contracts (PSD), i.e., debt
contracts with coupon payments that are adjusted following changes in the
borrower’s credit risk. If the credit risk increases (decreases), coupons are
increased (decreased) to pre-specified levels. In exchange, the borrower pays
a lower (higher) initial spread. Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010) show
3 For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that optimistic managers have higher
cash flow investment sensitivities and prefer to finance projects internally. Malmendier
and Tate (2008) investigate the effect of optimism on takeover activity and find that
optimistic managers overpay for target firms and prefer internal financing to finance their
acquisitions. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find that optimistic managers are more
likely to follow pecking-order financing choices and are reluctant to issue funds externally.
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theoretically that high quality borrowers will select PSD contracts to credibly
signal their type and benefit from lower initial spreads and from lower coupon
payments in the future. On the other hand, low quality borrowers are not able
to do so because this option is too costly for them as they know that they
would have to pay higher coupons in the future. Thus, PSD can be used as
a screening mechanism for banks to distinguish between high and low qual-
ity borrowers. We predict that firms with optimistic managers are in general
more likely to select PSD contracts than their rational counterparts. Opti-
mistic managers overestimate their firms’ future cash flows and therefore also
the likelihood that the credit quality of their firms will improve. Consequently,
they perceive themselves as good types and pool with higher quality borrowers
to benefit from better funding terms.
Our empirical evidence is in line this hypothesis. Firms managed by op-
timistic CEOs are more likely to choose PSD. Within the set of PSD contracts,
optimistic managers choose PSD with a higher performance-pricing sensitiv-
ity than rational managers. That is, contracts with greater punishments for
performance deterioration. Consistent with an overestimation of credit qual-
ity, we furthermore find that firms with optimistic managers are significantly
more likely to experience a performance deterioration, i.e., credit quality de-
creases, after the loan issue than firms with rational managers. This finding
also rules out that optimistic managers have positive inside information rather
than upwardly biased beliefs on their firms credit quality. Overall, our find-
ings show that managerial optimism is an important determinant in a firm’s
debt contracting policy and directly impacts the chosen instrument and its
risk features.
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The second paper (with Tim R. Adam) analyzes the relation between
managerial overconfidence and corporate speculation with derivatives.4 Géczy,
Minton, and Schrand (2007) analyze survey data and find that 40% of surveyed
firms use derivatives to speculate at "least sometimes". This result is surpris-
ing given that most derivative transactions take place in efficient markets such
as interest rate or foreign exchange markets. In this paper, we argue that
overconfidence might be a driver of corporate speculation using derivatives.
Overconfident managers overestimate their abilities relative to others and are
likely to believe to have superior market timing abilities. In addition, if over-
confident managers bet on market movements based on false beliefs of having
superior market timing abilities, we expect that speculation should lead to
speculative losses.
In our analysis, we use a unique dataset on hedge derivatives in the gold
mining industry. Analyzing derivative usage in the gold mining industry is
particularly interesting because (i) gold producers have a clear risk exposure
to the gold price and at the same time a variety of gold hedge instruments
at their disposal and because (ii) gold producers’ public disclosure on deriva-
tive holdings provides superior information on derivative holdings compared to
other industries.5 Using this information together with information on firms’
gold reserves and production figures allows calculating a hedge ratio, which
provides a good proxy of how much of the company’s estimated future gold
production is hedged using derivatives. We measure corporate speculation
using the time variation in the hedge ratio over the last four quarters. The in-
4 This paper uses the optimism classification described above to identify managers as over-
confident. Otto (2014) shows that optimism and overconfidence are highly correlated
biases among managers.
5 Contrary to most other industries, firms in the gold mining industry disclose information
on the type of derivatives held (e.g., option contract or forward contract), maturity of
instruments as well as forward or strike prices.
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tuition is that firms have few incentives to vary their hedge ratios significantly
over a short horizon.6
The empirical analysis in this paper confirms the empirical predictions
mentioned above. We find that CFO overconfidence is related to higher varia-
tion in hedge ratios and that speculative losses are significantly higher for firms
with overconfident CFOs. In contrast, CEO overconfidence is not related to
higher variation in hedge ratios or to speculative losses. This result is consis-
tent with the idea that it is mainly the CFO who is responsible for financial
decisions of a firm such as hedging.
The third paper documents a relation between CEO optimism and cor-
porate payout policy. The question whether corporations should pay out ex-
cess cash via dividends or share repurchases has been subject of a number of
studies in the last two decades, however, there is no conclusive answer so far
(Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002)). While most existing studies focus on firm
characteristics, we argue that managerial optimism is likely to affect how a
firm distributes excess cash. Optimistic managers persistently perceive their
firm as undervalued because they overestimate their abilities in managing the
firm. This has direct implications for the payout policy of a firm managed
by an optimistic manager: (i) Raising external funds is perceived as unduly
costly to optimistic managers and therefore the firm should rely on internal
cash to finance investment. Consequently, these firms should pay out less to
shareholders relative to firms with rational managers. (ii) Because optimistic
managers perceive their firm’s equity as undervalued, buying back shares is
seen as a positive NPV project.
6 We are aware that changes in firm fundamentals could explain some of this variation.
We rule out that our results are driven by changes in firm fundamentals by using the
residual of the hedge ratio (estimated using standard hedge ratio regressions) to calculate
the variation in the unexplained part of the hedge ratio. Our results remain unaffected.
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Both arguments are expected to have an impact on the payout channel
design of a company managed by an optimistic manager. While the first argu-
ment applies to both dividends and share repurchases, the second argument is
only valid for repurchases. If optimistic managers rely more on internal cash
flow, they should pay out less. The effect on share repurchases, however, is
less clear: If the undervalued equity argument dominates the costly external
financing argument, then optimistic managers should use more share repur-
chases relative to rational managers and vice versa. However, conditional on
paying out cash, optimistic managers should always prefer share repurchases
over dividends.
The empirical results in this paper provide support for the hypotheses
presented above. We find that firms with optimistic CEOs pay out 8-10% more
in form of share repurchases relative to firms managed by rational CEOs. In
addition, we find that optimistic CEOs also repurchase more shares in terms of
total assets. On the other hand, we do not find significant differences in total
payouts between firms with rational and optimistic CEOs confirming prior
results in a study by Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013).
To summarize the results of the thesis, managerial biases such as opti-
mism and overconfidence can have an important impact on corporate financial
policies. The thesis presents three additional policies where managerial biases
are found to play a role. The thesis thereby extends the relatively new liter-
ature on the impact of behavioral biases, especially managerial optimism and
overconfidence, on corporate financial policies.
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Managerial Optimism and Debt Contract
Design
Tim R. Adam Valentin Burg Tobias Scheinert Daniel Streitz
Abstract:
We examine the impact of managerial optimism on the inclusion of performance-
pricing provisions in syndicated loan contracts (PSD). Optimistic managers
may view PSD as a relatively cheap form of financing given their upwardly
biased expectations about the firm’s future cash flow. Indeed, we find that
optimistic managers are more likely to issue PSD, and choose contracts with
greater performance-pricing sensitivities than rational managers. Consistent
with their biased expectations, firms with optimistic managers perform worse
than firms with rational managers after issuing PSD, which implies that ex-pot
PSD was an expensive form of financing for optimistic managers. Our results
show for the first time that behavioral aspects can affect contract design in
the market for syndicated loans.
Keywords: Behavioral Bias, Optimism, Performance-Sensitive Debt, Debt
Contracting, Syndicated Loans
JEL-Classification: G02, G30, G31, G32
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1 Introduction
"The market was giving us a reduction in basis points on the coupon, and
we felt there was no probability of violating the covenants [i.e., the performance-
pricing thresholds]."–John Bowen, Morton International Inc., Investment Deal-
ers’ Digest, June 1990.
In 1990, Morton International issued performance-sensitive debt (PSD), which
stipulated that the coupon would rise if Morton’s credit rating were to dete-
riorate. In return, Morton received a lower initial coupon than without this
performance-pricing provision. The above quote indicates that at the time of
this debt issue the CFO of Morton International, John Bowen, considered it
to be highly improbable that Morton would be downgraded. Unfortunately,
he was wrong. During the life of this debt contract, Morton was downgraded
several times, from AA to BBB. Obviously, this may have been bad luck. On
the other hand, Morton’s CFO may have had overly optimistic expectations
about the firm’s future performance, and due to these expectations included
a performance-pricing provision in the debt contract. This paper therefore
aims to explore in a systematic manner whether managerial biases, such as
optimism, impact the use of performance-pricing provisions.
Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010) hypothesize that performance-
sensitive debt (PSD) can be used to signal a firm’s unobservable information
about its credit quality to potential lenders. Lenders, who cannot distinguish
between high and low quality firms, offer borrowers a menu of contracts, which
includes fixed-rate debt and risk-compensating PSD. High quality firms choose
PSD because the initial coupon rate is lower compared to fixed-rate debt. Low
quality firms, on the other hand, will not mimic high quality firms as low
quality firms expect their credit qualities to deteriorate in the future, which
would trigger coupon rate increases and thus higher borrowing costs compared
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to straight debt contracts. In the resulting separating equilibrium high quality
firms issue PSD, while low quality firms issue straight debt.
We argue that optimistic managers, who persistently overestimate their
firms’ future expected cash flow, may (irrationally) decide to mimic high qual-
ity firms and issue PSD in order to benefit from the relatively low initial
coupon rate offered by lenders on PSD. This possibility gives rise to a num-
ber of new testable hypotheses, which we evaluate in this paper. First, opti-
mistic managers should exhibit a greater likelihood of using PSD than rational
managers because optimistic managers should prefer PSD regardless of firm
type. Second, optimistic managers may choose PSD contracts with more risk-
compensation, that is, contracts with a higher sensitivity of the coupon rate to
performance changes, than rational managers on average. This is because con-
tracts with more risk-compensation offer lower initial coupon rates. Finally,
the post-issue performance of PSD-issuing firms led by optimistic managers
should be worse than the post-issue performance of PSD-issuing firms led by
rational managers, due to the biased expectations of optimistic managers.
We examine these hypotheses using a sample of syndicated and non-
syndicated loan tranches issued between 1992 and 2010, obtained from the
LPC Dealscan database. Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) report that the
use of performance-pricing provisions has become widespread since the early
1990s. In Adam and Streitz (2014), 47% of loans reported in Dealscan contain
performance-pricing provisions.
The terms managerial optimism and overconfidence have been used in-
consistently in the literature. We define managerial optimism to mean that
the executive persistently overestimates the firm’s future expected cash flow.
Of course, future cash flow expectations are not observable. We therefore fol-
low the methodology discussed in Malmendier and Tate (2005a) and classify
CEOs as optimistic if they ever hold an option until maturity, which is at
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least 40% in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. The rationale be-
hind this measure is that CEOs who typically have a large fraction of personal
wealth tied to their companies and only limited diversification abilities across
alternative investments should rationally exercise an option once it is in-the-
money and exercisable. Only executives who are overly optimistic about their
firm’s future return would decide not to exercise their stock options in these
situations.
Our results are consistent with the above empirical predictions. Opti-
mistic CEOs are 6% more likely to issue PSD than rational CEOs.1 This is
economically significant given an overall mean of about 50%. Furthermore,
optimistic managers choose PSD with a higher performance-pricing sensitivity
than rational managers. That is, contracts with greater punishments for per-
formance deterioration. Finally, we find that firms with optimistic managers
perform worse after the issuance of PSD compared to firms led by rational
managers. This result rules out the possibility that the managers, which we
classify as optimistic, possess positive inside information about their company’s
future performance. If this were true, issuing PSD could be a rational choice
driven by different information sets and not by differences in opinions. In fact,
our result suggests that the issuance of PSD has been harmful for firms run by
optimistic managers. All our results are robust to various optimism measures
and to the inclusion of other manager characteristics such as age, tenure, or
education.
A potential concern with our analysis is that a firm’s choice to hire an
optimistic CEO may be endogenous. This decision might be correlated with
the same variables that also affect the decision to issue PSD. We address this
1 The CEO is likely to be involved in the design of these debt contracts because the aver-
age loan in our sample is large and represents about 30% relative to outstanding debt.
Furthermore, given that the performance-pricing provision is viewed as a costly signal, it
can have a large negative impact on the firm’s future financial situation (see Manso et al.
(2010)). According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) CEO optimism can also affect a firm’s
corporate culture in general and hence the willingness to bear risks.
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issue in two ways. First, we model the firm’s choice to hire an optimistic
CEO using a propensity score matching approach, that is, we match each firm
that is managed by an optimistic CEO to a firm that is equally likely to be
managed by an optimistic CEO but is indeed managed by a rational CEO. Our
results are qualitatively unaffected. The main drawback of this procedure is
that we can only match based on observable characteristics. In a second step,
we therefore control for unobservable (time-invariant) firm characteristics by
testing whether the policy to issue PSD changes after CEO turnover with
optimistic successors. We find that optimistic CEOs increase the issuance of
PSD after being hired while incoming rational CEOs decrease the fraction of
PSD issues. The difference between these two groups is highly significant.
We contribute to three strands of the literature. First, our results extend
the existing literature on the impact of managerial biases on corporate financ-
ing decisions. For example, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) and Graham,
Harvey, and Puri (2013)) show that managerial optimism affects firms’ capital
structure decisions.2 The study that is closest to ours is Landier and Thesmar
(2009). The authors analyze the debt capital structure of small firms and find
that optimistic entrepreneurs prefer lines of credit over longer term bank debt.
Our study differs from this analysis in several fundamental ways. First, the
decision to issue PSD is not equivalent to debt maturity choice, because short-
term debt exposes the borrower to changes in the market credit risk premium,
while PSD locks-in the current market risk premium for the duration of the
loan. Second, we show that managerial biases can affect debt contract design
in large public corporations. Finally, we examine the effect of managerial opti-
2 See also Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013), Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Ruther-
ford, and Stanley (2011), Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013), Ferris, Jayaraman, and
Sabherwal (2013), Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011), Goel
and Thakor (2008), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Lowe and Ziedonis (2006), Mal-
mendier and Zheng (2012) and Otto (2014). Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) provide
an excellent survey on behavioral corporate finance.
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mism on firm performance, documenting negative consequences of contracting
by optimistic managers for the corporation.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to show that
managerial biases can have a significant impact on the structure of syndicated
loans. The prior literature has focused solely on neoclassical theories. For
example, Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), Ivashina and
Kovner (2011), and Prilmeier (2011) show that repeated interactions between
borrowers and lenders can reduce information asymmetries, which can impact
loan contract terms. Dass, Nanda, and Wang (2011) document that agency
problems affect the syndicate structure. Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2012)
and Qian and Strahan (2007) analyze how macroeconomic conditions and laws
and institutions shape debt contracts.3 We add to this literature by showing
that behavioral biases can also affect syndicated loans.
Third, we contribute to the literature on performance-pricing provisions
in corporate debt contracts. Asquith et al. (2005) argue that PSD is used
to reduce debt renegotiation costs, while Manso et al. (2010) show that PSD
can be used as a signaling device for a firm’s credit quality. Other studies
document a link between PSD and earnings management (Beatty and Weber
(2003)), manager equity incentives (Tchistyi, Yermack, and Yun (2011)), and
relationship lending (Adam and Streitz (2014)). Our paper is the first to
establish a link between the use and design of PSD and managerial optimism.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our
hypotheses, while Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 contains the em-
pirical analysis of the impact of managerial optimism on PSD contract terms.
In Section 5 we test the robustness of our results, and Section 6 concludes.
3 This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, as the literature on syndicated loans is very
large.
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2 Hypothesis Development
In performance-sensitive debt (PSD) the coupon rate is a deterministic func-
tion of the issuer’s performance. The coupon rises if the borrower’s perfor-
mance deteriorates and/or falls if the borrower’s performance improves. Manso
et al. (2010) show that PSD can be used as a screening device in a setting with
asymmetric information between borrower and lender. In their model, the
growth rate of the cash-flow process of a firm is private information and de-
pends on the firm’s quality. The lender, who cannot observe the true quality
(cash-flow growth rate) of a potential borrower, offers a menu of contracts,
which includes fixed-rate debt and risk-compensating PSD. In the resulting
separating equilibrium low-growth firms choose to issue fixed-rate debt, while
high-growth firms choose to issue risk-compensating PSD. The low-growth firm
has no incentive to deviate from this equilibrium because despite the initially
low coupon rate offered on PSD, PSD subjects the low-growth firm to coupon
rate increases in the future when its true type is revealed. Thus, low-growth
firms would face higher borrowing costs overall if they were to issue PSD rather
than regular debt.
In their model, Manso et al. (2010) assume that the manager of a firm
correctly assesses the cash-flow growth rate of his firm and chooses the debt
contract according to this expectation. However, the recent literature ques-
tions this assumption (e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005a)). In particular, op-
timistic managers could persistently overestimate the firms’ cash-flow growth
rate, while rational managers correctly assess the firms’ cash flow growth rate
on average. As a result, optimistic managers of low-growth firms may now de-
cide to pool with rational managers of high-growth firms.4 This implies that
optimistic managers are more likely to issue PSD than rational managers.
4 The pooling of optimistic managers with rational managers of high-growth firms preserves
the general separating equilibrium as long as there are not too many optimistic managers.
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Hypothesis 1: Optimistic managers are more likely to issue risk-compensating
PSD than rational managers.
Note that for Hypothesis 1 to hold, we do not require the assumption that
the average quality of the firms managed by optimistic managers is different
from the quality of firms managed by rational managers. We only require that
there are firms for which it is optimal to issue PSD and firms for which it is
optimal to issue fixed-rate debt in both groups. Then some low-growth firms
that are managed by optimistic managers will issue PSD, as the optimistic
manager overestimates the firm’s cash flow growth rate and thus overestimates
the value of the option implicit in the performance-pricing provision. Low-
growth firms managed by rational managers will choose fixed-rate debt because
the initially reduced coupon is not sufficient to compensate for the expected
costs of being downgraded.
Our theory builds on the assumption that optimistic managers are overly
optimistic and do not possess superior knowledge of their firms’ cash flow
growth rate. If this is the case, then the post-issue firm performance of op-
timistic managers should be worse than the post-issue firm performance of
rational managers using PSD. Put differently, Hypothesis 1 stipulates that
some low-growth firms with optimistic managers choose PSD contracts and
pool with high-growth firms that have rational managers. Therefore, the set
of firms with rational managers that have issued PSD contracts solely consists
of high-growth firms, while the set of firms with optimistic managers that have
issued PSD contracts consists of both high-growth and low growth firms. This
gives rise to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The performance following a PSD issue is worse for
firms managed by optimistic managers than for firms managed by rational
managers.
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3 Data Description
3.1 Managerial Optimism
We start by classifying CEOs as either rational or optimistic following
Malmendier and Tate (2005a), that is, we measure optimism based on execu-
tive option holdings. We use ExecuComp to obtain information on executive
stock option grants, exercised options, and option holdings. We restrict our
sample to the 1992 to 2010 period and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999). As ExecuComp contains option exercises only in an aggregated form
and not on the grant level, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and apply a
FIFO-algorithm to construct the option portfolios in a given year.5 Thereby
executives are classified as optimistic if they ever hold an option until maturity,
which is at least 40% in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity.6 Thus,
optimism is considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic
of an executive.
The intuition for relying on the executives’ option exercise behavior as
a means of classification into rational or optimistic managers is the following:
Executives face a trade-off between exercising their options or keeping the
options for later exercise. By keeping the options, they maintain the right
to purchase company stock at potentially more favorable conditions in the
future. The downside of this strategy is that it involves substantial costs for the
executive in terms of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Executive stock options
typically have a maturity of ten years and become vested after two to four
years. Furthermore, diversifying this exposure is problematic as executives
are legally prohibited from short-selling their company’s stock. Given the
5 See Appendix 1 in Hall and Liebman (1998) for further details.
6 The threshold is derived according to Hall and Murphy (2002) by using a constant risk
aversion parameter of 3 and 67% of wealth in company stock. The original Malmendier
and Tate (2005b) classification does not require a minimum threshold for in-the-moneyness
and solely requires option holding until maturity.
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large fraction of personal wealth tied to their company, diversification abilities
across alternative investments are also limited. Lastly, besides the financial
exposure, also a substantial fraction of the executive’s human capital is tied to
the company (Malmendier and Tate (2008)). Consequently executives can be
considered as under-diversified investors, who have a large exposure to their
company’s risk. Thus, rational executives should divest as soon as the option is
sufficiently in-the-money because the cost of delayed exercise typically exceeds
its option value. In contrast, executives who are optimistic and therefore
overestimate the firm’s future return may fail to exercise their stock options
in these situations.
3.2 Loan Sample
We obtain loan contract information from LPC Dealscan for all compa-
nies for which the CEO of the borrowing firm can be classified as optimistic
or rational.7 We additionally merge our loan deal panel to COMPUSTAT to
obtain financial information on the borrowers.8 We refer to the Appendix for
a detailed description of the control variables used.
Dealscan reports information on performance pricing provisions included
in loan contracts. In particular, Dealscan reports the pricing grid, that is, a
step function schedule linking the interest payments to a measure of finan-
cial performance.9 We define a dummy variable, PSD, which equals one if a
loan contract includes a performance-pricing provision and zero otherwise. We
further distinguish between interest-increasing, interest-decreasing, and mixes
7 As common in the literature the loan panel is created on the facility (tranche) level (e.g.,
Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2013), and Bharath, Dahiyab, Saunders, and Srinivasan
(2007)).
8 We use the link provided by Michael Roberts to merge Dealscan with COMPUSTAT (see
Chava and Roberts (2008) for details). We obtain borrower information from the last
available fiscal year before the loan issue.
9 The most common financial measure used in PSD contracts reported in Dealscan is the
debt-to-EBITDA ratio (∼ 50% of all PSD loans issued by US borrowers) followed by
the senior debt rating (∼ 25%). Other less commonly used measures are the interest
coverage ratio, the fixed charge ratio or leverage. A minority of PSD deals uses multiple
performance criteria.
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PSD. In interest-increasing contracts the coupon rate on the loan mostly in-
creases if the borrower’s creditworthiness declines. Interest-decreasing and
mixed PSD are defined accordingly. In particular, we define the following
ratio:
Rate De-/Increase = SInitial − SMin
SMax − SMin . (1)
SInitial is the interest rate paid at contract inception and SMax (SMin) is
the highest (lowest) interest rate defined in the pricing grid. Rate De-/Increase
is zero (one) if the pricing grid allows for interest increases (decreases) only.
Contracts with a ratio between zero and one allow for both interest rate
increases and interest rate decreases. We define indicator variables for ter-
ciles of this ratio to categorize PSD contracts into (mainly) rate-increasing,
mixed, and (mainly) rate-decreasing.10 Disentangling rate-increasing and rate-
decreasing PSD is important as our main hypotheses are derived for rate-
increasing PSD.11
Figure 1 shows the pricing grid of a loan issued by IBM in March 2004
as an example. In this contract, the interest rate changes with IBM’s senior
debt rating. Since IBM’s senior debt rating at the time of the issue was A+,
this loan is an example of a mixed PSD contract.
[Figure 1 here]
10 For robustness we replicated all our specifications defining only contracts as rate-increasing
(rate-decreasing) if Rate De-/Increase is exactly equal to zero (one). The remaining PSD
contracts, that is, contracts with Rate De-/Increase between zero an one, are defined as
mixed. All our results remain unchanged if we use this alternative definition.
11The use of rate-decreasing PSD can be motivated by other reasons. For example, Asquith
et al. (2005) argue that rate-decreasing PSD is a prepayment option for the borrower,
which does not require renegotiation. The interest rate is automatically reduced if there
are unanticipated improvements in the borrower’s performance, thereby lowering renego-
tiation costs.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
We provide descriptive statistics for borrower and loan characteristics in
Table 1. We divide the sample into firms managed by optimistic and rational
managers. Panel A reports descriptives for borrower characteristics. Unsur-
prisingly, the companies in our sample are large. By relying on information
from the ExecuComp database, which covers all companies listed in the S&P
1,500, we effectively restrict our sample to large public US companies. Borrow-
ers with CEOs that are classified as optimistic are on average smaller compared
to borrowers with CEOs that are classified as rational. The mean/median size
is $7,452/$2,225 million USD for rational borrowers and $6,502/$2,136 million
USD for optimistic borrowers. The other borrower characteristics are similar.
Panel B.1 provides descriptive statistics for general loan characteristics. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that the fraction of PSD contracts is 4%
higher in the sample of loans issued by optimistic CEOs when compared with
loans issued by rational CEOs (57% vs. 53%). The median loan amount is
$250 for both groups and also the median maturity is similar (about 5 years).
Panel B.2 provides descriptive statistics for the subset of performance-sensitive
loans. Within PSD contracts firms managed by optimistic managers in partic-
ular issue more rate-increasing PSD if compared to firms managed by rational
managers.
[Table 1 here]
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4 Managerial Optimism and Performance - Sen-
sitive Debt
4.1 Performance-Sensitive vs. Straight Debt
In this section, we analyze the relationship between managerial optimism
and the use of PSD. We begin by estimating the following Logit regression
specification:
PSDit = α + β ∗Optimisticit + γ ∗X ′it−1 + δ ∗ Y ′it + ϵit. (2)
The dependent variable, PSD, is a dummy variable, which equals one if
the loan contract includes a performance-pricing provision and zero otherwise.
Optimistic indicates whether the borrowing firm is managed by an optimistic
CEO.X is a set of borrower characteristics and Y a set of loan characteristics.12
We also include industry (2-digit SIC code), year, rating (notch), loan type,
loan purpose, and bank fixed effects.
[Table 2 here]
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that managerial traits may sig-
nificantly impact the firms’ decision to issue PSD. Loans issued by optimistic
CEOs are about 6% more likely to contain performance-pricing provisions than
loans issued by rational CEOs. Smaller firms are also more likely to issue PSD
than larger firms. Furthermore, larger loans and loans that have a longer ma-
turity are more likely to contain performance-pricing provisions. These find-
ings are consistent with the existing literature, which argues that PSD can be
used to overcome asymmetric information problems (see Asquith et al. (2005),
12As noted in the data section, we obtain borrower information from the last available fiscal
year before the loan issue (t− 1).
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Manso et al. (2010)), which are more significant in larger loans and loans of
longer maturities.
Next, we examine whether the higher likelihood of using PSD by opti-
mistic managers is driven by rate-increasing or rate-decreasing PSD. To do so,
we estimate a multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable can
take on four values: 0 for straight debt, 1 for (mainly) rate-increasing PSD, 2
for mixed PSD, and 3 for (mainly) rate-decreasing PSD.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 shows that the effect reported in Table 2 is solely driven by
a preference of optimistic managers for rate-increasing PSD contracts. Opti-
mistic managers are about 2% more likely to use rate-increasing PSD, while we
find no significant correlation between optimism and mixed or rate-decreasing
PSD. Overall, these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
4.2 PSD Pricing-Grid Structure
The previous section has shown that optimistic managers are more likely
to issue PSD than rational managers. Given that optimistic managers over-
estimate their firms’ future cash flow growth rates and thus overestimate the
value of the option implicit in the performance-pricing provision, optimistic
managers may be tempted to sell more options, which they perceive as being
overvalued. We therefore analyze the structure of the PSD pricing grids in
more detail in this section. Figure 2, shows the average pricing grid of firms
with optimistic and rational CEOs. The graph indicates that the difference be-
tween the maximum and the minimum coupon rate is on average higher if the
CEO is optimistic than if the CEO is rational.13 Of course, the graphical evi-
13The median credit rating at the time of the loan issue is BBB+ for both optimistic and
rational CEOs, suggesting that the differences in the pricing grids are not driven by
differences in the riskiness of the issuing firms.
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dence serves as a first indication only, as borrowers with optimistic CEOs and
borrowers with rational CEOs are not unconditionally comparable (borrower
and loan characteristics may differ).
[Figure 2 here]
To analyze the PSD structure in a more refined way, we follow Tchistyi
et al. (2011) and calculate the slope of the pricing grid of a PSD contract. The
slope relates coupon rate changes resulting from changes in the issuer’s credit
rating to differences in market interest rates over the same rating changes.14
A slope of one implies that the pricing grid reflects the market interest rate
structure at origination of the loan issue. A slope measure greater than one
indicates that the coupon rate is more sensitive to rating changes than market
interest rates at origination of the loan issue. To differentiate between up-
and downgrade effects we further calculate slope measures separately for the
rate-increasing and the rate-decreasing regions of the pricing grid. Similar to
Tchistyi et al. (2011), we calculate the slope "locally" (pricing steps directly
adjacent to the initial interest rate) and as the average slope over the pricing
grid. The local slope is defined as follows:
LocalSlope = 0.5 ∗
(
(Si+1 − Si)
(Bondi+1 −Bondi) +
(Si − Si−1)
(Bondi −Bondi−1)
)
, (3)
where Si is the coupon rate that the borrower pays at the initial rating i. Si+1
(Si−1) is the coupon rate, which the borrower pays at the next higher rating
(lower) rating notch. Bondi denotes a bond market index at rating i. We use
the Bloomberg Bond Market Index for the construction. The average slope
is calculated similarly by using all interest rate changes defined in the pricing
grid. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure. Bondi, Bondi+1, and Bondi−1 are
the levels of the bond market index for the respective rating notches at the
14 Since market interest rates are available only for particular rating classes, we can calculate
slope measures for rating-based PSD only.
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time of the loan issue. We use the level of the Bloomberg Bond Market Index
for each rating notch at the time of loan issue. As noted above the average
slope is calculated similarly by using all interest rate changes defined in the
pricing grid. Figure 3 illustrates this procedure.
[Figure 3 here]
The OLS regression results relating the slope of rating-based PSD con-
tracts to managerial optimism are reported in Table 4. We follow Tchistyi
et al. (2011) and define the slope of fixed rate debt to be zero.15 We address
skewness in the slope measure by using ln(Slope) in the regressions.
[Table 4 here]
As shown in Table 4, we find that loans issued by optimistic CEOs have
significantly larger local slopes over regions of rating downgrades. This means
that optimistic CEOs choose pricing provisions that allow for larger interest
rate increases (relative to the market yield) than PSD contracts chosen by
rational CEOs. Results for the average slope measures are similar to those for
the local slope measures. To summarize, optimistic CEOs choose pricing grids
with steeper slopes compared with the slopes of the pricing grids chosen by
rational CEOs.
4.3 Post-Issue Performance
In this subsection, we test whether firms with optimistic managers per-
form worse after issuing rate-increasing PSD relative to firms with rational
managers (Hypothesis 2 ). In particular, we estimate the following model:
∆Performanceit+k = α + β1 ∗Optimisticit + γ ∗X ′it−1 + δ ∗ Y ′it + ϵit. (4)
15Both the economic and statistical significance of our results remains unaffected if we use
a Tobit specification with zero as the lower bound.
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∆Performanceit+k is the change in financial performance of the bor-
rower k years after the issue (k = 1, 2).16 We use two different measures
of firm performance: the debt-to-EBITDA ratio and the firm’s credit rating.
These two measures are the two most commonly used performance measures in
PSD contracts.17 The regression includes rate-increasing PSD contracts only.18
We focus on rate-increasing PSD because as shown in Table 3, managerial op-
timism is related to the use of rate-increasing PSD only. Table 5 presents the
regression results.
[Table 5 here]
The results in Columns 1 and 2 show that the debt-to-EBITDA ratio of
firms with optimistic CEOs increases in the years following a PSD issue relative
to firms with rational CEOs. This effect is economically large. A change of 0.4
(Column 1) represents about one half of the standard deviation of the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio. This suggests that the performance (here: leverage) of these
firms deteriorates significantly after the loan issue, leading to higher interest
payments. In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable,
which equals one if the issuer is downgraded following the loan issue and zero
otherwise. The results show that the credit rating of firms with optimistic
CEOs is about 5% more likely to be downgraded one year after a PSD issue
compared to the credit rating of firms managed by rational CEOs. Again,
this result is consistent with the hypothesis that following PSD issues, the
performance of firms with optimistic CEOs is worse than the performance of
firms with rational CEOs.
16To ensure that our performance measure is not affected by the loan issue, we calculate
performance changes based on financial statements, which are issued after the respective
loan issue.
17More than 75% of all PSD contracts are written on either the issuer’s credit rating or the
issuer’s debt-to-EBITDA ratio.
18Using both PSD and straight debt contracts and interacting Optimistic with a PSD
indicator variable yields very similar results.
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Note that the results in Table 5 also rule out a possible alternative expla-
nation of our results. Delaying the exercise of an in-the-money option can be a
rational strategy if the manager possesses positive inside information. There-
fore, being optimistic may capture positive inside information of a manager
and not only irrational over-optimism. In this case, "optimistic" managers may
issue PSD simply because they possess positive inside information about the
firm’s future performance. However, if this were the case, we would expect firm
performance following a PSD issue to be better than that of rational managers
on average. Our findings show that the opposite is the case.
4.4 Endogeneity
A potential concern with our analysis is that managerial optimism may
be an endogenous choice by the firm’s owners when selecting a CEO. The
same factors that drive the choice of the CEO could in principle also deter-
mine the use of PSD. In order to address this problem we use a propensity
score matching approach and estimate the probability that a firm is managed
by an optimistic CEO. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) argue that a rea-
son for hiring optimistic CEOs might be that optimistic managers are more
likely to invest in more innovative and riskier projects and can thereby benefit
shareholders. We explicitly control for firm age in the first stage regression
because innovations are more important in younger firms.19 Furthermore, we
use several firm characteristics, such as total assets, leverage, market-to-book,
asset tangibility, interest coverage, profitability, current ratio, and industry-
, year- and credit rating (notch level) fixed effects as additional explanatory
variables. In untabulated results we find that firms with lower leverage ratios,
higher market-to-book ratios, lower interest coverage ratios, and younger firms
are more likely to be managed by optimistic CEOs. In the next step we match
19We compute firm age based on the data provided by Laura Field and Jay Ritter available
on http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/foundingdates.htm. The data is described in de-
tail in Loughran and Ritter (2004). Firm founding dates are only available for roughly
50% of our sample, which leads to a sample reduction in Table 6.
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firms based on the probability to be managed by an optimistic CEO, that is,
we match one firm that is managed by an optimistic CEO to a firm that is
predicted to be managed by an optimistic CEO but is indeed managed by a
rational CEO.
[Table 6 here]
In Table 6 we report results of a logit regression specification as in Table 2
for the matched sample. We find that optimistic CEOs are 9-10% more likely to
issue performance-sensitive debt contracts compared to rational CEOs. Thus,
our results are even stronger after accounting for a possibly endogenous selec-
tion of optimistic CEOs.
A drawback of the propensity score matching technique is that the choice
to hire an optimistic CEO can only be modeled based on observable firm
characteristics. To control for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics
that might be correlated with the use of PSD and managerial optimism, we
examine PSD issuance after CEO turnover.
In particular, we compare the use of PSD of incoming optimistic CEOs
with the use of PSD of incoming rational CEOs three years before and three
years after the turnover event.20 We are forced to disregard the type of the
outgoing CEOs due to data limitations. Conditioning our analysis on the type
of outgoing CEO would render the sample size to be too small for statistical
inference. Not conditioning on the type of the outgoing CEO, however, is
conservative as it biases our tests against finding a statistically significant
relationship.
We estimate two separate models with a dummy variable equal to one
if the company issues a loan with a performance-pricing provision and zero
20The results are remain unaffected if we vary the event window and use, for example, five
years before and after the turnover.
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otherwise as dependent variable. The first column includes only observations
where the incoming CEO is optimistic, the second column only observations
where the incoming CEO is rational. Both regressions include the same control
variables as in Table 2. To see whether optimistic CEOs pursue a different
policy with respect to the use of PSD we estimate a difference-in-differences
model. The first difference is calculated as the difference between the fraction
of loans with a performance-pricing feature before and after the CEO turnover,
represented by the coefficient Post Turnover. The second difference is the
difference in the coefficient Post Turnover between optimistic and rational
CEOs.
[Table 7 here]
Our results are presented in Table 7. We find that optimistic CEOs sig-
nificantly increase the fraction of loans with a performance-pricing provision
while rational CEOs seem to decrease the fraction of PSD (although not sig-
nificantly). The difference between both coefficients is significantly different
from zero suggesting that optimistic CEOs are more likely to issue PSD rel-
ative to rational CEOs even after controlling for unobservable, time-invariant
firm effects.
5 Robustness
5.1 Other Optimism Measures
In this section, we analyze whether our results are robust to alternative
methods to identify optimistic managers. In particular, we consider different
moneyness thresholds for the original optimism classification, distinguish be-
tween Pre- and Post-Optimism, and consider alternative methods to identify
optimism.
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[Table 8 here]
Table 8 replicates Table 2 but uses alternative optimism measures. In
Columns 1 and 2 we use more conservative moneyness thresholds than in
our original optimism classification. In particular, we identify executives as
optimistic if they ever hold an option until one year prior to expiration, which is
at least 70% in-the-money (Column 1) or at least 100% in-the-money (Column
2). The original classification uses a moneyness threshold of 40%. The results
in Table 8 confirm our previous findings. Firms managed by optimistic CEOs
are significantly more likely to include a performance-pricing provision in their
loan contracts than firms managed by rational CEOs. Thus, our results are
not sensitive to the choice of the moneyness parameter, which is consistent
with the robustness checks in Malmendier and Tate (2008).
Next, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and distinguish between
the time before and after an optimistic manager has ever shown evidence of
being optimistic. The motivation for this separation is to justify the treatment
of optimism as a time-invariant, personal characteristic. Pre-Optimism refers
to the time period before the respective executive first holds an option that is
at least 40% in-the-money until the final maturity year, and Post-Optimism
refers to the time period thereafter. Table 8 shows that optimistic CEOs are
significantly more likely to use PSD than rational CEOs, both before and after
they are classified by our algorithm. This finding supports the notion that
optimism is a time-invariant, personal characteristic.
In Column 4 we employ a different identification method of optimism,
suggested by Malmendier and Tate (2005b). According to this method, CEOs
are classified as optimistic if they hold stock options that are at least 67% in
the money five years after the respective option grants. A CEO needs to show
this behavior at least twice during his tenure to be classified as optimistic.
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Malmendier and Tate (2005b) refer to this measure as Holder 67.21 Using the
Holder 67 measure instead of the original optimism variable, our results are
even stronger than before.
In Column 5, we use a new identification method of optimism first pro-
posed by Sen and Tumarkin (2009). Instead of analyzing executives’ option
exercise behavior, this method examines the executives’ stock holdings. An
executive is classified as optimistic if his total stock holdings relative to his
salary exceed the median stock holdings to salary ratio. The intuition for this
classification is similar to the Optimistic classification. Executives are gen-
erally poorly diversified and have a large idiosyncratic risk exposure to their
firms. Consequently, they should hold as little of their companies’ stock as
possible. If executives voluntarily hold more stock, they are likely to be overly
optimistic with respect to the future performance of their firms. According
to Core and Larcker (2002), many firms have a minimum stock holding re-
quirement for their top executives in place, which often is stated in terms of
multiples of the executives’ salary. Like Sen and Tumarkin (2009) we use the
median of this stock holdings-to-salary multiple as our threshold to distinguish
between rational and optimistic executives. Again, the results in Table 8 con-
firm our previous findings that firms with optimistic CEOs are more likely to
use performance-pricing provisions than firms managed by rational CEOs. In
summary, our findings are robust to several alternative optimism specifications.
5.2 CEO Characteristics
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that managerial style, which is likely
to be affected by manager characteristics such as age, gender or educational
background, significantly affects corporate financial policy. For example, Be-
ber and Fabbri (2012) find that CEO age and education is correlated with
speculation in the FX market. Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that male exec-
21We are grateful to Rik Sen for providing us with this measure.
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utives make riskier financial and investment decisions than female executives.
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) find that general CEO ability and ex-
ecution skills matter in buyout and venture capital transactions. To address
the concern that our optimism measure may be correlated with CEO charac-
teristics that also affect risk-taking and therefore the decision to issue PSD, we
explicitly control for CEO age, tenure, gender, and education in this section.
In addition to personal managerial characteristics, executive compensa-
tion plans are likely to also affect risk-taking behavior. In the context of PSD,
Tchistyi et al. (2011) document that managers whose compensation is more
sensitive to stock return volatility choose riskier pricing grids. To rule out the
possibility that our results are driven by a correlation between the optimism
measures and the delta/vega of the CEOs stock option portfolio, we explicitly
control our analysis for these sensitivities. We follow Core and Guay (2002) in
calculating delta and vega. The results are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 here]
The only variable that is significantly correlated with the decision to issue
PSD is optimism. The other personal characteristics, as well as the delta and
the vega of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio are not significantly related
to the decision to issue PSD. As noted above, controlling for delta and vega
mitigates concerns that our optimism measure is positively correlated with a
larger general risk preference by those executives.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of managerial optimism on debt con-
tract design. In particular, we investigate whether optimistic CEOs, given
their overly optimistic views about their firms’ future performance, are more
likely to issue performance-sensitive debt (PSD) than rational managers. This
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possibility arises because optimistic managers overestimate the value of the op-
tion implicit in the performance-pricing provision. Thus, optimistic managers
perceive PSD as a relatively cheap form of financing.
We find that optimistic managers are indeed more likely to issue PSD
than rational managers. We further find that within the subset of PSD-issuing
firms, optimistic managers choose contracts with higher performance-pricing
sensitivities, i.e., pricing grids with more coupon rate increase potential in
response to performance deterioration. Finally, we find that firms managed
by optimistic managers perform worse after a PSD issue compared to firms
managed by rational managers. This result confirms our assumption that
optimistic managers have more biased views regarding their future performance
relative to rational managers and do not possess some information advantage.
Our results are robust to the endogenous selection of an optimistic CEO as well
as several measures of managerial optimism. Overall, our results indicate that
managerial optimism can have a significant impact on debt contract design in
the market for syndicated loans.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 1: PSD Pricing Grid Example
This figure shows the spread over LIBOR IBM paid on a syndicated loan
contract negotiated in March 2004. IBM’s senior credit rating at the time
of the loan issue was A+, the initial interest rate LIBOR + 12bp. Source:
Dealscan.
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Figure 2: PSD Pricing Grids - Optimistic vs. Rational CEOs
This figure shows the average pricing grids for firms with optimistic CEOs
(straight line) and rational CEOs (dashed line). The relative spread at each
rating notch is calculated as the actual spread at that rating notch divided by
the spread paid if the issuers credit rating is AAA.
39
Figure 3: Slope of the PSD Pricing Grid
This figure shows a hypothetical rating-based performance pricing grid. The
rating at the time of loan origination is assumed to be A-. The local Slope
measures the pricing grid slope around the initial rating, and is defined as
follows:
Local Slope = 0.5 ∗
(
SA− − SA
BondA− −BondA +
SA − SA+
BondA −BondA+
)
Si is the spread at rating notch i, Bondi is the level of the bond market index
for rating notch i. Local Slope ↑ and Local Slope ↓measure the local slopes for
rating increases and rating decreases respectively. The average slope measures
the overall slope of the pricing grid, and is defined as follows:
Average Slope = 13 ∗
(
SA − SA+
BondA −BondA+ +
SA− − SA
BondA− −BondA
+ SBBB+ − SA−
BondBBB+ −BondA−
)
We also define the average slopes for rating increases and rating decreases
according to the local slope definitions. The slope of straight debt is equal to
zero.
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A.2 Tables
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Table 2: Performance-Sensitive vs. Straight Debt
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals
one if a loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. The main variable
of interest is Optimistic, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO of the
borrower is classified as optimistic and zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined
in the Appendix. The regressions include year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch
level), deal purpose (corporate, debt repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial
paper backup, or other), and loan type (term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility)
dummies when indicated. Marginal effects for each covariate are calculated as the difference
in predicted probabilities for a particular outcome computed at their mean values holding
all other covariates constant. For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change from
the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level
to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Optimism Classification
Optimistic (0/1) 0.052∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics
ln(Total Assets) −0.109∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Leverage −0.231∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.097 −0.082
(0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.082)
Market-to-Book −0.021∗ −0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Tangibility −0.034 −0.007 −0.049 −0.071
(0.079) (0.077) (0.080) (0.083)
Interest Coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.045 0.008 0.028 0.026
(0.091) (0.090) (0.092) (0.096)
Current Ratio −0.012 −0.011 −0.010 −0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Panel C: Loan Characteristics
ln(Facility Amount) 0.139∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
ln(Maturity) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
Multiple Tranches (0/1) 0.022 0.027 0.071∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Secured (0/1) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 6,705 6,703 6,703 6,538
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.138 0.184 0.212
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Table 3: Interest Increasing vs. Interest Decreasing PSD
This table reports the marginal effects of a multinominal logit regression. The dependent
variable equals one for PSD contracts that contain mainly spread increase features (Column
1), two for PSD contracts that contain both spread increase and spread decrease features
(Column 2), three for PSD contracts that contain mainly spread decrease features (Column
3) and zero for non-PSD contracts (base group). The independent variables are the same
as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The regressions include
year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch level), deal purpose (corporate, debt
repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial paper backup, or other), and loan type
(term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility) dummies when indicated. Marginal
effects for each covariate are computed as the difference in predicted probabilities for a
particular outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant.
For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent
observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PSD (Increasing) PSD (Mixed) PSD
(Decreasing)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.015∗∗ 0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001)
Firm Characteristics Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6,718
Pseudo R2 0.253
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Table 4: Managerial Optimism and the Slope of PSD Contracts
This table reports OLS regressions of the slopes of the performance pricing grids on CEO,
borrower and loan characteristics. The dependent variables are the various slope measures
defined in Figure 3. The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in
the Appendix. The regressions include year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch
level), deal purpose (corporate, debt repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial
paper backup, or other), and loan type (term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility)
dummies when indicated. The sample includes straight debt contracts and rating-based
PSD contracts. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level
to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Local Slopes
(1) (2) (3)
Local Slope Local Slope ↑ Local Slope ↓
Optimistic (0/1) 0.013∗ 0.004 0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,502 4,365 4,428
Adj. R2 0.254 0.223 0.237
Panel B: Average Slopes
(4) (5) (6)
Average Slope Average Slope ↑ Average Slope ↓
Optimistic (0/1) 0.011 0.007 0.013∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,502 4,366 4,430
Adj. R2 0.257 0.252 0.234
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Table 6: Propensity Score Matching - PSD vs. Straight Debt
This table reports the marginal effects for the second stage of a propensity score matching
model. The dependent variable equals one if a loan includes a performance-pricing provision
and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in
the Appendix. The regressions include year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch
level), deal purpose (corporate, debt repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial
paper backup, or other), and loan type (term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility)
dummies when indicated. The propensity scores are estimated in the first stage by a probit
regression using a dummy as the dependent variable that equals one if the firm is managed
by an optimistic CEO and zero otherwise. Marginal effects for each covariate are computed
as the difference in predicted probabilities for a particular outcome computed at their mean
values holding all other covariates constant. For factor levels it is computed as a discrete
change from the base level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2)
PSD(0/1) PSD(0/1)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 1,544 1,544
Pseudo R2 0.245 0.297
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Table 7: CEO Turnover - PSD vs. Straight Debt
This table reports estimation results of fixed effects linear probability models. The dependent
variable equals one if a loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix.
The regressions include year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch level), deal
purpose (corporate, debt repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial paper backup,
or other), and loan type (term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility) dummies when
indicated. The sample only includes loans issued during the three years before and after a
CEO turnover and loans of firms where the new CEO can be classified as either optimistic
or rational. In total, there are 161 CEO turnover events. Post Turnover is an indicator
variable which equals one if the loan was issued in the three years following a CEO turnover.
In model (1), the sample is restricted to events where the incoming CEO was classified as
optimistic. In model (2), the sample is restricted to events where the incoming CEO was
classified as rational. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
(1) (2)
PSD(0/1) PSD(0/1)
Post Turnover (0/1) 0.274∗ −0.082
(0.151) (0.084)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 236 620
Adj. R2 0.656 0.521
Test if coefficients are equal in both models:
Post Turnover (Optimistic) = Post Turnover (Rational)
χ2(1) = 7.04
Prob > χ2 = 0.0080***
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Table 8: Alternative Optimism Classifications
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals
one if a loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. Optimism 70 and
Optimism 100 are indicator variables that equal one if the CEO of the borrower is classified
as optimistic, i.e. if the CEO ever held an option until the final maturity year, which is at
least 60 or 100% in the money and zero otherwise. Holder67 is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if CEOs did not exercise options that were at least 67% in the money in their
fifth year at least twice during their tenure. Pre-Optimistic and Post-Optimistic indicate
the time period before an executive ever held an option until the final maturity year, which
is at least 40% in the money and the time period after this activity, respectively. Voluntary
Holder is an indicator variable that equals one if CEOs voluntarily holds more stocks of their
company than required by company constitutions. The other independent variables are the
same as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The regressions include
year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch level), deal purpose (corporate, debt
repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial paper backup, or other), and loan type
(term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility) dummies when indicated. Marginal
effects for each covariate are constructed as the difference in predicted probabilities for a
particular outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant.
For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent
observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PSD
(0/1)
PSD
(0/1)
PSD
(0/1)
PSD
(0/1)
PSD
(0/1)
Optimistic (60) (0/1) 0.044∗
(0.026)
Optimistic (100) (0/1) 0.048∗
(0.027)
Pre-Optimistic (0/1) 0.055∗
(0.031)
Post-Optimistic (0/1) 0.054∗
(0.029)
Holder 67 (0/1) 0.094∗∗∗
(0.029)
Voluntary Holder (0/1) 0.062∗∗
(0.026)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,538 6,538 6,538 3,273 6,259
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.236 0.205
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Table 9: CEO Characteristics
This table reports the marginal effects of logit regressions. The dependent variable equals
one if a loan includes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise. Female is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the CEO is female. Ph.D. is a dummy variable if the CEO
holds a Ph.D. degree. Tenure is the time in days since the executive became CEO. Delta
measures the sensitivity of the CEO’s overall option and stock portfolio to price movements
of the company’s stock. Vega measures the sensitivity of the CEO’s overall option and stock
portfolio to volatility changes of the company’s stock. The other independent variables are
the same as the ones used in Table 2 and are defined in the Appendix. The regressions
include year, industry (two-digit SIC), rating (rating notch level), deal purpose (corporate,
debt repayment, acquisition, working capital, commercial paper backup, or other), and
loan type (term loan, revolver, bridge loan, or 365-day facility) dummies when indicated.
Marginal effects for each covariate are constructed as the difference in predicted probabilities
for a particular outcome computed at their mean values holding all other covariates constant.
For factor levels it is computed as a discrete change from the base level. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent
observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1) PSD (0/1)
Optimistic (0/1) 0.056∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Female (0/1) 0.011 −0.011
(0.084) (0.089)
Ph.D. (0/1) −0.045 −0.070
(0.059) (0.059)
Ln(Age) −0.132 −0.125
(0.089) (0.094)
Tenure 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Delta −0.112 −0.203
(0.309) (0.322)
Vega −0.004 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit Rating Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Deal Purpose Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,407 5,985 5,859
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.211 0.211
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Table 10: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition
Managerial Characteristics:
Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds
executive stock options until the last year of maturity that
are at least 40% in-the-money and zero otherwise.
Optimistic (60) (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds
executive stock options until the last year of maturity that
are at least 60% in-the-money and zero otherwise.
Optimistic (100) (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds
executive stock options until the last year of maturity that
are at least 100% in-the-money and zero otherwise.
Pre-Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one in the time period be-
fore a manager ever held an option until the final maturity
year, which is at least 40% in the money and zero otherwise.
Post-Optimistic (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one in the time period after
a manager ever held an option until the final maturity year,
which is at least 40% in the money and zero otherwise.
Holder67 (0/1) A dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds
options five years after the option grant that are at least
67% in-the-money. This behavior has to be shown at least
twice by the manager.
Voluntary Holder (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if
Stock Holdings
Salary >= Median(
Stock Holdings
Salary ) and zero other-
wise, where:
Stock holdings is the value of company stock held by the
CEO in $million.
Salary is the CEO salary in $million.
Delta Overall delta of the option and stock portfolio held by the
CEO divided by total shares outstanding. The individual
stock delta is one per definition, the delta of an individual
option is defined as e−dTN(Z).
Vega e−dTN ′(Z)ST 1/2 ∗(0.01). In our regressions we use log(1+
vega) to correct for the skewness of vega.
Continued on next page
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Variable Name Definition
where:
Z =
[
ln (S/X) + T
(
r − d+ σ2/2)] /σT 1/2
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distri-
bution
N
′ =normal density function.
S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the
option
r = natural logarithm of the risk-free rate
T = time to maturity of the option in years
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the
life of the option
Female (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO is female.
Ph.D. (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO holds a
Ph.D. degree.
Age Age of the CEO in years at the time of the debt issue.
Tenure Time in days since the executive became CEO.
Borrower/Issuer characteristics:
Total Assets Firm’s total assets in $million.
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book Market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets.
Tangibility Net property plant and equipment divided by total assets.
Interest Coverage Interest expenses divided by EBITDA.
Profitability EBITDA divided by total assets.
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities.
Debt-to-EBITDA Total debt divided by EBITDA.
No Rating (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was
not rated by S&P at the time of the debt issue.
AA or better (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was
rated better than AA- by S&P at the time of the debt issue.
Continued on next page
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Betw. AA- and A- (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was
rated between AA- and A- by S&P at the time of the debt
issue.
Betw. BBB+ and BB- (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was
rated between BBB+ and BB- by S&P at the time of the
debt issue.
B+ or worse (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrower was
rated worse than BB- by S&P at the time of the debt issue.
Rating Downgrade (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the borrowing firm
was downgraded k years after a PSD issue and zero other-
wise.
Loan characteristics:
Facility Amount Overall facility volume in $million.
Maturity Time to maturity in months.
Multiple Tranches (0/1) A dummy that equals one if the deal consists of more than
one tranche and zero otherwise.
Secured (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contains
collateral
Post Turnover (0/1) An indicator variable which equals one if the loan was issued
in the three years following a CEO turnover.
PSD grid characteristics:
PSD (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract in-
cludes a performance pricing provision and zero otherwise.
PSD(Rating) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract in-
cludes a performance pricing provision based on the issuer’s
credit rating and zero otherwise.
PSD(Accounting) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if the loan contract
includes a performance pricing provision based on an ac-
counting ratio and zero otherwise.
PSD(Increasing) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if Si−SMinSMax−SMin <
1
3 and
zero otherwise.
Continued on next page
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PSD(Mixed) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if 13 >=
Si−SMin
SMax−SMin <
2
3 and zero otherwise.
PSD(Decreasing) (0/1) A dummy variable, which equals one if Si−SMinSMax−SMin >=
2
3
and zero otherwise.
# Pricing Steps Number of pricing steps defined in the pricing grid.
Local Slope 0.5 ∗
(
Si+1−Si
Bondi+1−Bondi +
Si−Si−1
Bondi−Bondi−1
)
Local Slope ↑ Si−Si+1Bondi−Bondi+1
Local Slope ↓ Si−1−SiBondi−1−Bondi
where:
i is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract
inception
i+1 is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract
inception plus one notch (upgrade)
i−1 is the borrower’s long-term credit rating as of contract
inception minus one notch (downgrade)
Si is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating i
Si+1 is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating
i+ 1
Si−1 is the spread that the borrower has to pay given rating
i− 1
SMin is the lowest spread defined in the pricing grid
SMax is the highest spread defined in the pricing grid
Bond refers to the market spread for the respective rating
notch
Average Slope Calculated as Local Slope but over all rating notches de-
fined in the pricing grid.
Average Slope ↑ Calculated as Local Slope ↑, but over all credit ratings
above the firm’s rating at the time of contract inception.
Average Slope ↓ Calculated as Local Slope ↓, but over all credit ratings be-
low the firm’s rating at the time of contract inception.
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Managerial Optimism and Corporate
Speculation
Tim R. Adam Valentin Burg
Abstract:
Overconfident individuals overestimate their abilities and the precision of their
information signals and are therefore more likely to speculate on perceived
mispricings in financial markets. Using detailed data on derivative positions
of firms in the gold mining industry between 1992 and 2011, this paper shows
that CFO overconfidence is positively related to corporate speculation. We also
find that speculation is associated with higher speculative losses, especially for
firms with overconfident CFOs. In contrast, CEO overconfidence does not
seem to affect a firm’s use of derivatives for speculation.
Keywords: Behavioral Corporate Finance; Overconfidence; Risk Management;
Hedging; Corporate Speculation
JEL-Classification: G02, G14, G32, G39
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1 Introduction
Several studies have documented evidence, which is consistent with firms
using derivatives at least partly for speculative purposes. For example, Géczy,
Minton, and Schrand (2007) find that 40% of surveyed firms use derivatives to
speculate "at least sometimes". Dolde (1993) reports that a large fraction of
surveyed firms state that the amount of hedging depends on the view of future
market movements. Although corporate speculation with derivatives appears
widespread, firms are not very successful at doing so: Brown, Crabb, and
Haushalter (2006) and Adam and Fernando (2006) report that the economic
gains from corporate speculation are small at best and that speculation does
not appear to generate value on average. These findings raise the question,
why firms speculate if it is not profitable to do so? Do behavioral biases,
such as managerial overconfidence, perhaps play a role in a firm’s decision to
trade with derivatives? For example, Odean (1998) shows that overconfidence
induces trading because overconfident individuals overestimate the precision
of their information signals.
We investigate these questions by examining the quarterly derivatives
holdings of all public North American gold mining firms between 1992 and
2011. We focus on this industry because it provides, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the most detailed data about firms’ financial derivatives positions, which
enables us to define a measure of excessive derivatives trading, and a measure
of the gains/losses, which accrue solely from a firm’s derivatives transactions.
We complement this data with compensation data from Execucomp and proxy
statements to classify managers as overconfident following the methodology
proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a). According to their definition a
manager is overconfident if he or she ever held an option until maturity, which
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was at least 40% in-the-money the year-end prior to maturity. This definition
has been used by several studies.1
We confirm the findings of Adam and Fernando (2006) that there ap-
pears to be significant amount of excessive trading with derivatives, and that
this excessive trading produces only marginally positive cash flows on aver-
age. Our first new result is that we find a positive correlation between the
extent of corporate speculation and managerial overconfidence. Among the
firms that use gold derivatives, firms with an overconfident CFO have signif-
icantly higher variation in their hedge ratios. In particular, the coefficient of
variation is about 0.25 higher in firms with overconfident CFOs, which is eco-
nomically significant given an overall mean of about 0.6. Furthermore, we find
a negative relation between the extent of speculation and the gains from spec-
ulation. Firms that speculate more realize larger losses. Corporate speculation
generates even larger losses if the CFO is overconfident than if the CFO is ra-
tional.2 We also test whether CEO overconfidence has an effect on corporate
speculation, but do not find any significant relation. This is consistent with
the CFO rather than the CEO being responsible for the execution of a firm’s
derivative strategies (Bodnar, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2014)). All
results are robust to the chosen overconfidence classification, various measures
of speculation, and to the inclusion of other manager characteristics such as
age or education.
The decision to select an overconfident manager might be endogenous.
We address this issue by using a propensity score matching technique and
match firms that are likely to be managed by a non-overconfident manager but
are indeed managed by an overconfident manager to similar firms managed by
1 See, for example, Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), or
Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe (2013).
2 In terms of economic significance, firms with overconfident CFOs realize higher speculative
losses of approximately nine dollars per derivative contract relative to firms with rational
CFOs. This is significant given an overall mean of speculative cash flow of about seven
dollars per contract.
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non-overconfident managers. Our results remain unaffected after accounting
for a potential endogenous selection.
We make two major contributions to the existing literature. First, we
extend the literature on corporate speculation. Stulz (1996) argues that firms
have an incentive to speculate if (i) they have superior information and if their
financial situation allows them to take on additional risks, or (ii) if they are
close to bankruptcy. Brown et al. (2006) and Adam and Fernando (2006) find
evidence for a substantial amount of speculation by gold mining companies
but only small profits resulting from speculation. Géczy et al. (2007) use sur-
vey data and report that 40% of sample firms sometimes "take a view" when
using derivatives. Faulkender (2005) and Chernenko and Faulkender (2011)
show that interest rate derivative usage is primarily driven by speculative ob-
jects. Finally, Beber and Fabbri (2012) show that individual characteristics
of managers such as age, MBA or work experience are related to corporate
speculation. We add to this literature by showing that managerial overconfi-
dence can have a significant impact on a firm’s tendency to speculate. Firms
with overconfident CFOs are more likely to bet on market movements and
can suffer significant losses resulting from speculation. This finding comple-
ments the literature on the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate
financial policies. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005a) show that over-
confident managers prefer to fund investment projects internally, while Adam,
Burg, Scheinert, and Streitz (2014) show that overconfident managers prefer
debt contracts with performance pricing provisions and fare worse with these
contracts. Barber and Odean (2000) and Barber and Odean (2001) find that
overconfident retail investors trade common stock more frequently, which is
harmful to their performance.3
3 See also Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013), Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Ruther-
ford, and Stanley (2011), Deshmukh et al. (2013), Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Gervais,
Heaton, and Odean (2011), Goel and Thakor (2008), Hirhsleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012),
Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier et al. (2011), and Otto (2014).
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the effect of the CFO on corpo-
rate financial policies. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) show that the CFO’s
incentives are related to debt-maturity and earnings-smoothing decisions. Mal-
mendier and Zheng (2012) show that mainly financial outcome variables are
associated with CFO overconfidence. Consistent with their paper, we show
that a firm’s derivative usage, in particular speculation, is affected by CFO
overconfidence.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our
empirical predictions, while Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains
the empirical analysis on the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate
speculation. In Section 5 we test the robustness of our results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Empirical Predictions
Overconfidence is usually referred to as an overestimation of the preci-
sion of information signals (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982)).4 The
theoretical literature in finance and economics relates overconfidence with ex-
cessive trading of financial assets. The intuition behind this relation is that
individuals that are overly confident about their information signals and thus
their view on the value of a specific asset are more often inclined to trade an
asset that they perceive as misvalued.5
In the context of derivative usage of corporations, derivative instruments
are widely used tools for risk management. However, the implicit leverage in
these instruments allows corporations also to use derivatives "selectively" and
4 There exist two alternative definitions of overconfidence: (i) The better-than-average effect
describes the tendency of individuals to overestimate their abilities relative to others. (ii)
Illusion of control means that individuals believe to have control over external events. In
this paper, we refer to the definition of overconfidence as an overestimation of the precision
of information signals.
5 Theoretical models investigating overconfidence in a financial setting include, for example,
Kyle and Wang (1997), Odean (1998), and Gervais et al. (2011).
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thus to speculate on rising or falling prices of the underlying.6 Survey evidence
confirms that managers try to incorporate their market views into their risk
management decisions. For example, Géczy et al. (2007) find that 40% of
surveyed derivative users in their sample speculate at least "sometimes" and
relate this to perceived information advantages. As the firms in their sample
use foreign exchange or interest rate derivatives, the perceived information
advantage seems unlikely in the light of market efficiency. This is also likely
to be the case in the gold market.
Hypothesis 1: Overconfident managers speculate more using deriva-
tives than non-overconfident managers.
There is no direct implication on the performance of excessive trading
of overconfident individuals.7 The empirical literature, on the other hand,
documents a lower risk-adjusted performance in individual brokerage accounts
for individuals that engage in excessive trading (Barber and Odean (2000)). In
summary, we expect that speculation by overconfident risk managers should
not result in positive speculative gains.
Hypothesis 2: Overconfident Managers realize lower cash flows from
speculation than non-overconfident managers
6 The term "selective hedging" was first introduced by Stulz (1996) and describes how firms
adjust their hedge positions in order to speculate on market movements. We use the terms
selective hedging and speculation interchangeably in this paper.
7 In efficient markets, the price of each financial instrument should reflect its fair value.
Thus, positions that result from excessive trading should also have a fair value and should
in theory not lead to abnormal positive or negative performance.
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3 Data Description
3.1 Sample Selection
We restrict our sample to US and Canadian gold producers because gold
mining firms provide detailed information about their derivative holdings in
annual and quarterly reports. Therefore, this industry serves as an ideal lab-
oratory to study derivative usage. In particular, firms report information on
the type of derivative (forward, spot deferred contract, options, gold loans)
as well as strike/forward prices and maturities. The data include only gold
derivative positions (i.e., we do not have information about derivative posi-
tions in foreign exchange, interest rate or other commodities).8 The data is
taken (i) from a survey conducted by Ted Reeve of Scotia Capital between
1989 and 1999 and (ii) from a survey conducted by GFMS between 2002 and
2011.9 We check if the data is accurate by manually inspecting quarterly and
annual reports of all firms. Derivative data from 2000 and 2001 is manually
recorded from quarterly and annual reports. Additionally, we use Compustat
to search for gold producers not included in the two surveys by checking all
firms with a three-digit SIC code of 104. If these firms report positive gold
production figures, we add them to the sample and manually collect derivative
positions from quarterly and annual reports.10 In total, our sample comprises
139 gold producing firms.
Earlier studies on derivative usage in the gold mining industry (e.g.,
Adam and Fernando (2006)) calculate hedge ratios by using production fore-
casts over a timespan of five years. For example, the one year hedge ratio
8 We manually checked annual reports of all firms in our sample and found that about 95%
of firms only use gold derivatives.
9 GFMS was acquired by ThomsonReuters in 2011. Hedge surveys are now available from
ThomsonReuters.
10 For Canadian firms, filings can be downloaded form http://www.sedar.com. For all US
firms, we use EdgarPro to download filings.
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of a firm is calculated by computing the delta of all outstanding gold deriva-
tives that mature in the upcoming fiscal year and dividing it by the forecasted
production in the upcoming fiscal year. In this study, the hedge ratio is cal-
culated by dividing the total delta of all derivative positions by the amount of
gold reserves that are proven and probable (i.e., economically feasible gold re-
serves). The amount of proven and probable gold reserves is disclosed by gold
mining firms on a yearly basis and gold producing firms are required to report
these figures. Further, proven and probable reserve estimations are validated
by third party certified geologists. The hedge ratio in this study therefore
refers to the fraction of gold reserves that are hedged using gold derivatives.
Additionally, we compute hedge ratios by using the annual gold production
as the denominator of the hedge ratio. Both reserve and production figures
are available from Compustat beginning in 2000. For the time before, these
figures are hand collected from annual reports.
The sample of gold producing firms is complemented with financial in-
formation on the gold producers from Compustat. For some of the sample
firms no financial information is available in Compustat and for these firms,
financial information is hand collected from annual reports. Further, infor-
mation on the management (age, compensation, MBA or PhD for both the
CEO and CFO) of the firm is obtained from proxy statements as well as from
biographies available on the websites of Forbes and BusinessWeek. This data
is used for robustness checks.
3.2 Overconfidence Classification
We classify CEOs and CFOs of all gold producers as overconfident fol-
lowing Malmendier and Tate (2005a) and measure overconfidence based on
executive stock option holdings. We use ExecuComp and hand collect com-
pensation data from proxy statements to obtain all available information on
stock option grants, exercised options, and existing option holdings. The data
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on option grants and option holdings available in ExecuComp and in proxy
statements contains option exercises only in a consolidated manner (i.e., details
such as exercise price and maturity of the exercised options are not disclosed).
Therefore, we follow Hall and Murphy (2002) and apply a first-in-first-out al-
gorithm to construct option portfolios in a given year.11 We then identify a
manager as overconfident if he/she ever holds an option until maturity that is
at least 40% in-the-money at the year-end prior to the maturity year.12 Thus,
overconfidence is treated as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic
of the executive.
The intuition behind using the manager’s executive stock option exercise
behavior in order to classify him as overconfident is the following: Executives
are faced with a trade-off between exercising their options or maintaining the
options for later exercise. If an executive keeps the options, he maintains the
right to buy the company’s stock at potentially better conditions in the future.
The downside is that this decision involves costs for the executive in that he will
be exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Executive stock options typically have long
maturities of about ten years and become vested only after two to four years.
Further, managers are not allowed to diversify their exposure for example by
short-selling their company’s stock. In addition, a large fraction of their wealth
is tied to their company which makes diversification with other investments
difficult. Lastly, also a substantial fraction of the executive’s human capital is
linked to the company (Malmendier and Tate (2008)). Thus, executives can
be considered as under-diversified investors who have a large exposure to their
company’s risk. Consequently, rational executives would divest as soon as the
option is in-the-money because the cost of delaying exercise usually exceeds
11 Further details concerning the construction of the option portfolios and the overconfidence
classification are discussed in the general Appendix.
12The moneyness threshold is derived pursuant to Hall and Murphy (2002) using a risk
aversion parameter of 3 and assuming that 67% of the executive’s wealth consists of
his company’s equity. Malmendier and Tate (2005a), who introduced this classification
method, did not require a minimum threshold.
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its option value. In contrast, executives who are overly confident about their
ability to manage their firms and therefore overestimate the firm’s future return
possibly fail to exercise their stock options in these situations.
One potential concern with the above measurement of overconfidence is
that it could also be interpreted as a measure of optimism: Managers might
believe that their companies’ stock price is too low because they are optimistic
about future developments but not necessarily overconfident with respect to
their abilities. However, Otto (2014) shows that overconfidence and optimism
are highly correlated among managers by analyzing EPS forecasts of large US
companies. Therefore, the measure we use in our analysis should also reflect
managerial overconfidence.
3.3 Measuring Speculation
Measuring the degree of speculation with (hedge-)derivatives is a difficult
task. So far, only a few studies use data on derivative holdings from balance
sheets to identify how much firms speculate. Adam, Fernando, and Golubeva
(2012) use the variation in hedge ratios during short-term periods. Precisely,
they use "the absolute value of the difference in the natural logarithms of the
hedge ratios at the beginning and the end of each quarter" (Adam et al. (2012)
p. 11). Beber and Fabbri (2012) use an alternative measure and compute
first hedge regressions with the hedge ratio as dependent variable and firm
characteristics that are standard in the risk management literature as inde-
pendent variables. Then, they use the residuals of this regression to compute
the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm.
We follow both studies and compute two measures of speculation. First,
we follow Adam et al. (2012) and compute the coefficient of variation of the
hedge ratio for the last four quarters on a rolling basis.13 Second, we check if
13We also check our results for robustness by using other windows and using the last six,
eight or ten quarters. Results are discussed in Section 5
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our results hold if we follow Beber and Fabbri (2012) and estimate the residual
of hedge-ratio regressions and then compute the standard deviation of these
residuals. In Figure 1, we illustrate our speculation measure more precisely.
The solid line represents the average hedge ratio in the industry over time. The
dashed lines represent the averages of the hedge ratio for the last four quarters
(benchmark 1) and for the last eight quarters (benchmark 2). These averages
can be interpreted as benchmarks and our speculation measure measures how
much firms deviated
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample of gold producers.
[Table 1 here]
In total, we have 659 quarterly observations coming from 40 different
firms. The number of firms is relatively small for two reasons.14 First, we
analyze only firms that use derivatives at least once during the sample period.
This reduces the sample of all gold producers by approximately 50%. Second,
we lose observations because we require that both the CEO and CFO can
be identified as overconfident. The overconfidence classification introduced by
Malmendier and Tate (2005b) relies on the exercise strategies of managers and
classifies managers as overconfident or non-overconfident if they hold in-the-
money executive stock options until the last year of maturity. Because these
options have usually long maturities ranging to up to ten years, managers
need to stay on the payroll of the company for a long time in order to be
classified as overconfident or non-overconfident. We lose approximately 65%
of the remaining observations because these managers cannot be classified. We
lose so many observations because we require that both the CEO and CFO of
14Overall, the sample of gold mining firms includes roughly 4000 quarterly observations.
For details concerning the sample selection we refer the reader to Section 3.1.
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a company can be identified at the same time. In untabulated results we check
if summary statistics on the variables presented in Table 1 are different when
we use all possible observations and find that firms included in the analyses to
follow are similar to the sample of all firms in the gold mining industry.
In Panel A we report summary statistics on derivative and hedge posi-
tions of the sample firms. The average company hedges about 6% of all proven
and probable reserves, the standard deviation of the hedge ratio is 0.15 and
relatively high. When the hedge ratio is measured in terms of annual produc-
tion, it is (unsurprisingly) higher and the mean is approximately 0.9 (standard
deviation of 1.15). The coefficient of variation in the sample firms’ hedge ra-
tio illustrates how firms vary their hedge ratios over time. In particular, it
is equal to the ratio of the standard deviation of the hedge ratio in the last
four quarters to the mean of the hedge ratio in the last four quarters. The
mean coefficient of variation is 0.57 indicating that the volatility of the sample
firms’ hedge ratios is relatively high. This is in line with the findings of Adam
and Fernando (2006) who document that a considerable amount of specula-
tion takes place in the gold mining industry. Adam and Fernando (2006) use
derivative position to compute the cash flow that results from entering and
closing out derivative positions. In addition, they develop a method to divide
the cash flow into a speculative part and benchmark part. The benchmark part
is computed as the cash flow that would have realized if a company held its
hedge ratio constant over the last four quarters. The speculative part is equal
to the difference between the total cash flow and the benchmark cash flow.
They analyze the cash flow further and find an overall significantly positive
derivative cash flow but only small cash flow gains that result from speculation.
Cash flow is measured per contract, i.e. total cash flow scaled by the number
of derivative contracts outstanding. We use their methodology and also find
small cash flow gains (sample mean of 7.07) resulting from speculation, the
overall cash flow is negative (mean of -1.81). This may be due to the different
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sample periods analyzed. While Adam and Fernando (2006) analyze a time
period that ends in 1999 in which the gold price is stagnating, this study ana-
lyzes derivative usage between 1992 and 2011. In the last eleven years the gold
price is increasing which should lead to negative overall cash flows resulting
from the short positions that are typically entered by gold mining firms.15
Panel B shows summary statistics on manager characteristics. While 36%
of the CEOs are identified as being overconfident, only 17% of the CFOs are
identified as overconfident. The finding that overconfidence is more prevalent
among CEOs than among CFOs is in line with Malmendier and Zheng (2012).
Equity incentives are also more pronounced for CEOs: The average wealth of
the CEO increases by $68,000 if the company’s stock price increases by one
percent while the average CFO’s wealth increases by only $12,390.16 When
the volatility of the company’s stock price increases by one percent, the CEOs
wealth increases by $20,480 while the CFO’s wealth increases by only $7,390.
The summary statistics indicate that fewer CFOs are overconfident and CFOs
have lower equity compensation compared to CEOs.
Lastly, Panel C reports summary statistics for company characteristics
of the sample firms. Average firm size (measured as total asset size) is $1.5bn
while median assets are only $267mn. Thus, total assets are skewed and there-
fore we use the log of total assets in later regressions. The mean leverage of
sample firms is relatively low with 12%, the average market-to-book ratio is
1.59, 28% of firms pay dividends, firms have a quick ratio of 2.6, an Altman
(1968) Z-Score of 3.44 and a return-on-assets of -5.48%.
15 In the overall sample we identify only two firm quarters where companies hold overall a
net long position in derivatives.
16All dollar values in this study are nominated in USD currency.
67
4 Results
4.1 Variation in the Hedge Ratio
In this section, the relation between CEO/CFO overconfidence and cor-
porate speculation is investigated. Before analyzing the variation of the hedge
ratio of gold mining firms in a multivariate setting, we first take a look at how
the variation in hedge ratios differs among non-overconfident and overconfident
managers on average over all firms. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between
non-overconfident and overconfident CEOs (Panel A) and non-overconfident
and overconfident CFOs (Panel B) over time.17
[Figure 1 here]
At first glance, it seems that overconfident managers are more volatile
in their speculative activity. Both overconfident CEOs and CFOs demon-
strate (on average) peaks in 2001, 2005 and 2010 whereas firms with non-
overconfident managers are steadier and less cyclical in their tendency to spec-
ulate. When looking at level differences, there is no clear picture for CEOs:
During the sample period, overconfident CEOs have a higher variation in only
seven out of 17 years. For CFOs, however, we see a different picture. In 14 out
of 17 years, firms with overconfident CFOs vary their hedge ratios more often
and/or more intensely. Overall, the picture depicted in Figure 1 is consistent
with hypothesis 1: Firms with overconfident CFOs seem to speculate more
than non-overconfident CFOs. However, no clear picture can be derived for
CEOs and the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs are more likely to speculate
cannot be corroborated from Figure 1.
17The graph starts in 1995 because we are not able to identify any CFOs before that year.
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In order to rule out that other factors correlated with overconfidence im-
pact a firm’s tendency to speculate, we estimate the following OLS regressions:
CV(Hedge Ratio)t = β ∗OC(CEO)t−1 + γ ∗OC(CFO)t−1
+ δ ∗X ′t−1 + α + ϵt
(1)
where CV(Hedge Ratio) is the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio and
our proxy variable for speculation. OC(CEO) and OC(CFO) are indicator
variables that equal one if the CEO/CFO of the company was identified as
overconfident and zero otherwise. X is a vector of control variables includ-
ing log(total assets), leverage, the market-to-book ratio, the quick ratio, re-
turn on assets, Altman (1968)’s Z-score, and equity incentives of the manage-
ment (Delta(CEO/CFO) and log(vega)(CEO/CFO)).18 Additionally, we in-
clude quarter and country fixed effects when indicated.
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 presents results for regressions analyzing the relation between
managerial overconfidence and corporate speculation. The dependent variable
is the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio as defined as the delta of all gold
derivatives over total proven and probable reserves. The results indicate that
the hedge ratio of firms with overconfident CFOs is more volatile compared
to firms with non-overconfident CFOs. The coefficient of Overconfident CFO
is significantly positive in all four regression specifications at the one-percent
level. Overconfident CEOs, on the other hand, seem not to impact speculation
positively. The coefficient is only significantly positive in model (1) and (3)
but insignificantly negative in model (4) when we include firm characteristics
in the regression. The economic magnitude of the effect of CFO overconfi-
dence on corporate speculation is large: Firms with overconfident CFOs have
18 For detailed definitions of the variables used we refer the reader to Table 11.
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a coefficient of variation in their hedge ratio that is 0.25 higher than that of
non-overconfident CFOs. Compared to the overall mean of the coefficient of
variation of 0.59 (cf. Table 1) the coefficient underlines the large impact of
CFO overconfidence. Turning to the other control variables, we can infer that
firms with a higher Z-score and firms with more cash are more likely to spec-
ulate. This is consistent with Stulz (1996) who argues that financially sound
firms are able to afford potential losses stemming from speculative activities.
Furthermore, the vega of the CEO’s stock option portfolio is negatively re-
lated to speculation while the CFO’s vega is positively related to speculation.
Theoretically, more option compensation is expected to be positively related
to speculation as the value of options increases with volatility. Therefore, the
finding for the CFO is in line with this argument while the finding for the
CEO’s option portfolio is puzzling.
Table 3 presents results for a different specification. The dependent vari-
able here is the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio defined as the delta
of all gold derivatives over annual gold production.
[Table 3 here]
Results are similar to Table 2 and confirm the finding that corporate
speculation is related to CFO overconfidence but not to CEO overconfidence.
The coefficient of CFO overconfidence is again statistically significant at the
one-percent level in all four specifications. The coefficient in model (4) is
slightly smaller (0.2), but still large relative to the sample mean of 0.59. The
impact of the other control variables is similar as in Table 2.
Overall, Table 2 and 3 suggest that corporate speculation is positively
related to CFO overconfidence but not to CEO overconfidence. The economic
magnitude that can be derived from the regression results is large. Firms with
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overconfident CFOs have a coefficient of variation in their hedge ratio that is
between 0.2 and 0.35 higher than that of firms with non-overconfident CFOs.
4.2 Speculative Cash Flows
In this section we analyze the hypothesis whether firms with overconfi-
dent managers are able to realize cash flow gains from speculation. Unfortu-
nately, US and Canadian companies do not disclose cash flows that result from
derivative transactions. The advantage of analyzing firms in the gold mining
industry is that these firms provide detailed data on derivative instruments
outstanding at each fiscal quarter (cf. section 3.1). We follow the method de-
veloped by Adam and Fernando (2006) to (i) calculate cash flows from deriva-
tive transactions and (ii) to classify these cash flows into cash flows that are
attributable to hedging transactions and cash flows that are attributable to
speculative transactions. In particular, so called "benchmark cash flows" con-
stitute of that part of total cash flows that would have realized if a firm held its
hedge ratio constant over the last four quarters. "Speculative cash flows" are
equal to the difference between total cash flows and "benchmark cash flows".19
We estimate the following OLS regressions:
(
CF
Number of contracts
)
t
= β ∗OC(CEO)t−1 + γ ∗OC(CFO)t−1
+ δ ∗ CV(Hedge Ratio)t−1 + δ ∗X ′t−1 + α + ϵt
(2)
CF is the speculative/benchmark cash flow calculated following Adam
and Fernando (2006), Number of contracts is the number of gold derivatives
outstanding (in ounces). Thus, we analyze the cash flow per derivative con-
tract. OC(CEO) and OC(CFO) are indicator variables that equal one if the
19Details regarding the calculation of derivative cash flows can be found in Adam and
Fernando (2006).
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CEO/CFO of the company was identified as overconfident and zero otherwise,
CV(Hedge Ratio) is the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio over the last
four quarters, and X ′ is a vector of control variables including the same vari-
ables as X ′ in equation (1). We additionally include the coefficient of variation
in the hedge ratio in these regressions because the existing literature on trad-
ing and performance suggests a negative relationship between higher trading
levels and performance.20 Table 3 presents results of these OLS regressions.
[Table 4 here]
The first result from Table 4 confirms the findings of Barber and Odean
(2000). In Panel A, model (1) and (2), we find that companies with more
variation in their hedge ratio experience higher losses resulting from specula-
tion. Relative to a company that does not vary its hedge ratio, a company
with a coefficient of variation equal to one experiences speculative losses of
three to five dollars per gold derivative contract outstanding. In model (3), we
additionally include our main variables of interest, OC(CEO) and OC(CFO),
in the regression. We find that especially overconfident CFOs perform worse.
The results suggest that companies with an overconfident CFO realize high
speculative losses holding other firm characteristics constant. In particular,
these firms experience speculative losses amounting to nine dollars per con-
tract outstanding which can be attributed to the overconfidence of the CFO.
The coefficient of OC(CEO) is statistically insignificant. In terms of economic
significance, the median number of contracts outstanding is equal to 610,000
ounces. Thus, firms with overconfident CFOs incur median losses from specu-
lation amounting to $1.4mn each quarter.
20Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) document that households that trade exces-
sively in their personal portfolios perform worse with their common stock investments. In
particular, Barber and Odean (2000) find that households that trade most earn a return
of roughly 11.4% compared to a market return of 17.9% during 1991-1996.
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Overall, the evidence from Table 3 suggests a negative impact of over-
confidence, especially of the CFO, on speculative cash flows. On the other
hand, in Panel B we do not find a significant relation between the benchmark
cash flow and the variation in the hedge ratio or the overconfidence indicators.
Thus, the cash flow resulting from the general hedging activity is not affected
by overconfident managers or the variation in hedge ratios.
4.3 Addressing Endogeneity
Hiring an overconfident CEO or CFO might be endogenous and the fac-
tors determining the selection of overconfident managers might be correlated
with the same variables that drive corporate speculation. We address this
problem by using a propensity score matching approach: In the first stage,
we estimate the probability that a firm is managed by an overconfident CEO
(CFO) using a probit model. We control in the first stage for asset size, the
market-to-book ratio, leverage, Altman (1968)’s Z-Score, return on assets, the
quick ratio and explicitly for firm age.21 Hirhsleifer et al. (2012) and Galasso
and Simcoe (2011) argue that overconfidence can help a firm to pursue inno-
vation. We use firm age as proxy variable for a company’s need for innovation
and find in the first stage regression, that younger firms are significantly more
likely to hire overconfident CEOs and CFOs. In the second stage regression,
we match firms based on their likelihood to be managed by an overconfident
CEO (CFO) and match one firm managed by an overconfident CEO (CFO)
to another firm that is likely to be managed by an overconfident CEO (CFO)
but is indeed managed by a non-overconfident CEO (CFO). Table 5 presents
results of the second stage regression.
[Table 5 here]
21 Firm founding years are hand collected from annual reports and business profiles on
CapitalIQ.
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Our results from Table 2 are confirmed and we find no significant coeffi-
cient for Overconfident CEO but a significant positive coefficient for Overcon-
fident CFO. The magnitude of the effect is slightly stronger than in Table 2.
Thus, our results hold after accounting for a potential endogenous selection of
the manager.
We are aware that a propensity score matching approach can only match
firms based on observable firm characteristics. There are possibly other, un-
observable factors driving speculation and the selection of overconfident man-
agers at the same time. One possibility to control for these factors would be to
analyze CEO or CFO turnover and thereby control for unobservable (but time-
invariant) effects. Unfortunately, the sample of gold mining firms is relatively
small and other restrictions such as derivative usage as well as the classification
method to identify overconfidence reduce the sample size even further. After
accounting for these restrictions, we are left with only four CFO changes which
makes it impossible to analyze turnover to control for unobservable effects.22
5 Robustness
5.1 Sample Selection
The analysis so far contains only firms that use derivatives. Thus, a firm
decides to use derivatives in a first step and is then able to use these derivatives
to bet on market movements. To mitigate concerns that our analysis is prone
to selection bias, we use Heckman (1976)’s approach to correct for sample se-
lection by estimating a first stage probit regression to model the decision to
use derivatives and then incorporating a transformation of the estimated prob-
ability in a second stage regression (otherwise identical to model 1). Results
are shown in Table 6.
22 In untabulated results, we also check if corporate speculation changes after overconfident
CEOs are hired and find no effect confirming our previous results.
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[Table 6 here]
Our results are robust to sample selection concerns. The first stage re-
gression suggests that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives, and that
dividend paying firms and firms with more cash are less likely to use deriva-
tives. In the second stage regression, the effect of CFO overconfidence is similar
as in Table 2.
5.2 Alternative Overconfidence Measures
We test if our results are robust to the moneyness threshold of the over-
confidence classification in Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
In particular, we replicate Table 2 and identify managers as overconfi-
dent if they ever hold options until one year prior to maturity that are at least
20% (model 1), 60% (model 2) or 80% in-the-money (model 3). The results
confirm our findings: In all three specifications, there is a statistically signifi-
cant relation between CFO overconfidence and speculation but no statistically
significant relation between CEO overconfidence and speculation.
We also test our results for robustness using the classification proposed
by Sen and Tumarkin (2009). The drawback of this method is that it uses
information about stockholdings of managers and this reduces the sample size
of identifiable CFOs significantly as most of the companies in our sample are
Canadian and in Canada CFOs do not have to report stockholdings if these
are below a certain threshold. For the CEO, we find no significant impact of
overconfidence on speculation in untabulated results confirming our previous
results.
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5.3 Alternative Speculation Measures
We also test our results for robustness by using other proxy variables for
speculation. Our proxy variable for speculation in section 4.1 uses information
about the the hedge ratio in the last four quarters and is equal to the coeffi-
cient of variation in the hedge ratio during that time period. We additionally
replicate Table 2 by computing the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio
for the last six, eight, and ten quarters. Results are presented in Table 8.
[Table 8 here]
We find that our results are robust to different windows used to calcu-
late the coefficient of variation, the coefficient is significantly positive for all
specifications. In all specification, the coefficient is even greater in magnitude.
Beber and Fabbri (2012) propose an alternative measure for corporate
speculation. They use data on S&P500 firms between 1996 and 2001 and
analyze firms with positive foreign sales and firms reporting foreign exchange
(FX) derivative usage. Gross notional values of FX derivatives are used to
compute a hedge ratio using total assets as the denominator. Then, this hedge
ratio is regressed on firm fundamentals such as assets, leverage, and the market-
to-book ratio in a first stage regression. To measure speculation, they use the
standard deviation of the residual from the first-stage regression for each firm
(during the time the firm is included in their sample).
We follow Beber and Fabbri (2012) and first compute residuals from a
standard hedging regression using the same control variables including firm
fixed effects. In the second stage regression, we regress the standard deviation
of the residuals for each firm on the same control variables as in Table 2.23
Results are presented in Table 9.
23This results in one observation for each CEO/CFO combination within a firm explaining
the low number of observations in Table 8.
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[Table 9 here]
Results confirm the findings from our main regressions. Overconfident
CFOs have a significant positive effect on corporate speculation using the spec-
ulation measure of Beber and Fabbri (2012) whereas overconfident CEOs do
not significantly affect a firm’s tendency to speculate. Also the economic mag-
nitude of the effect for CFOs is high. The sample mean for the standard
deviation of the residual for all firms is equal to 0.03 such that the coefficient
of Overconfident CFO represents 100% of the overall mean.
5.4 Other Managerial Characteristics
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that manager fixed effects are
able to explain a large portion of the variation in corporate financial policies.
Based on their results, a number of empirical studies analyze how managerial
characteristics such as age, gender, or education can affect specific corporate
financial policies such as investment (Huang and Kisgen (2013)) or buyouts
(Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012)). Related to our analysis, Beber
and Fabbri (2012) show that younger managers and managers with an MBA
speculate more. To rule out that our results are driven by a correlation between
overconfidence and other personal characteristics such as age, education, and
gender, we check our results for robustness by including a gender dummy, age,
PhD and MBA dummies in our baseline regression 1. Results are presented in
Table 10.
[Table 10 here]
We find that including other managerial characteristics does not change
our previous results. In our sample there is no variation in the variables PhD
(CFO) and Male (CEO) (i.e., all of the CFOs in the sample do not have PhDs
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and none of the CEOs is female). Of the other coefficients, only Male (CFO)
is significantly different from zero suggesting that male CFOs are less likely
to speculate. As before, the coefficient of CFO Overconfident is statistically
significant from zero suggesting that firms with overconfident CFOs speculate
more when we control for other personal characteristics of the management.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how a firm’s tendency to speculate with deriva-
tives is impacted by overconfidence of the CEO and CFO . Overconfident man-
agers overestimate their abilities and the precision of their information signals
and should therefore be more likely to bet on market movements using hedge
derivatives. We find that firms with overconfident CFOs have higher variations
in their hedge ratio which is consistent with the aforementioned hypothesis.
On the other hand, we find no measurable effect of CEO overconfidence on
speculation. This result is in line with the findings of Malmendier and Zheng
(2012) who show that overconfidence of the CFO is significantly related to
financial outcome variables.
If excessive trading by overconfident CFOs is triggered by false beliefs
about the precision of a manager’s information we should also expect no supe-
rior performance resulting from speculation. This is also what we find in the
data – speculative cash flows are negatively related to CFO overconfidence.
Overall, our findings suggest that overconfidence can have a significant impact
on a firm’s derivative usage and in particular on a firm’s tendency to speculate.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 1: Speculation and Overconfidence
This figure shows the mean yearly coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio for firms with
overconfident and rational managers. The first graph (A) shows differences between firms
with rational and overconfident CEOs, the second one (B) differences between firms with
rational and overconfident CFOs.
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A.2 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of gold producers between 1992 and
2011. All variables are defined in Table 11.
Mean Median Std. Dev p1 p99 Obs.
A: Derivative Position
Hedge Ratio (Res.) 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.59 659
Hedge Ratio (Prod.) 0.95 0.49 1.22 0.00 6.67 659
Coeff. of Var. - HR (Res.) 0.59 0.41 0.55 0.03 2.00 659
Coeff. of Var. - HR (Prod.) 0.59 0.40 0.55 0.03 2.00 659
CF per Oz −1.81 0.00 35.01 −145.29 99.90 659
Pred. CF per Oz −8.88 0.00 48.70 −209.30 98.72 659
Spec. CF per Oz 7.07 0.00 34.57 −78.38 152.52 659
B: Manager Characteristics
OC(CEO) (0/1) 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 659
OC(CFO) (0/1) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 659
Delta (CEO) 67.85 27.35 155.45 1.29 1386.58 659
Delta (CFO) 12.39 4.87 25.82 0.00 220.95 659
Vega (CEO) 20.48 8.96 51.26 0.02 476.35 659
Vega (CFO) 7.39 2.49 22.98 0.00 217.99 659
C: Company Characteristics
Total Assets (in USD mn) 1456.04 267.12 3783.49 16.66 25996.00 659
Leverage 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.50 659
Market-To-Book 1.59 1.36 1.00 0.36 5.14 659
Dividends Paid (0/1) 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 659
Quick Ratio (%) 2.56 1.56 2.88 0.12 13.98 659
Altman Z-Score 3.44 2.56 4.87 −3.59 21.87 659
Return on Assets (%) −5.48 −1.85 19.52 −84.49 24.97 659
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Table 2: Speculation and Overconfidence: Variation in Hedge Ratios
(Reserves)
This table reports results for OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the coefficient
of variation in the hedge ratio (reserves) for the last four quarters. The main variables of
interest are OC (CEO) and OC (CFO), which are indicator variables that equal one if the
CEO/CFO of the firm was classified as overconfident. All other independent variables are
defined in Table 11. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered both at the
firm and fiscal quarter level to account for non-independent observations within firms and
time. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Reserves)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) 0.187∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.092
(0.077) (0.088) (0.093)
OC (CFO) 0.298∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.068) (0.090)
B: Firm Characteristics
log(Total Assets) −0.028
(0.034)
Market-to-Book −0.032
(0.044)
Leverage −0.357
(0.272)
Dividends Paid −0.019
(0.095)
Z-Score 0.023∗∗
(0.011)
Return on Assets 0.001
(0.001)
Quick Ratio 0.026∗∗
(0.012)
Delta (CEO) 0.000
(0.001)
Delta (CFO) −0.002
(0.005)
Log(Vega(CEO)) −0.136∗∗∗
(0.042)
Log(Vega(CFO)) 0.151∗∗∗
(0.052)
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,163 903 730 659
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.042 0.099 0.229
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Table 3: Speculation and Overconfidence: Variation in Hedge Ratios
(Production)
This table reports results for OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the coefficient
of variation in the hedge ratio (production) for the last four quarters. The independent
variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in Table 11. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered both at the firm and fiscal quarter level to account
for non-independent observations within firms and time. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Production)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) 0.249∗∗∗ 0.160∗ 0.104
(0.079) (0.083) (0.092)
OC (CFO) 0.346∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.067) (0.073)
B: Firm Characteristics
log(Total Assets) −0.035
(0.032)
Market-to-Book −0.015
(0.041)
Leverage −0.419
(0.269)
Dividends Paid −0.012
(0.096)
Z-Score 0.016∗
(0.009)
Return on Assets 0.000
(0.001)
Quick Ratio 0.032∗∗
(0.012)
Delta (CEO) 0.000
(0.001)
Delta (CFO) −0.002
(0.005)
Log(Vega(CEO)) −0.135∗∗∗
(0.037)
Log(Vega(CFO)) 0.141∗∗∗
(0.050)
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,211 932 759 659
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.055 0.087 0.271
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Table 4: Cash Flow and Overconfidence
This table reports results for an OLS regression. The dependent variables is the speculative
(Panel A) and the benchmark cash flow (Panel B) scaled by the number of derivative con-
tracts outstanding. The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined
in Table 11. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered both at the firm
and fiscal quarter level to account for non-independent observations within firms and time.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Speculative Cash Flow (per derivative contract)
(1) (2) (3)
A: Speculation
Variation in Hedge Ratio −3.997∗∗∗ −5.413∗∗∗ −5.633∗
(0.976) (1.476) (2.814)
B: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) 1.171
(2.829)
OC (CFO) −8.898∗
(5.163)
Control Variables No Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,061 1,965 643
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.070 0.071
Panel B: Benchmark Cash Flow (per derivative contract)
(1) (2) (3)
A: Speculation
Variation in Hedge Ratio 5.467 5.148 6.793
(2.108) (3.043) (6.370)
B: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) −5.255
(6.867)
OC (CFO) 12.798
(11.965)
Control Variables No Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,061 1,454 643
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.160 0.153
87
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching
This table reports results for the second stage of a propensity score matching model. The
dependent variable is the coefficient of variation in the hedge ratio (reserves) for the last four
quarters. The independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in Table 11.
The propensity scores are estimated in the first stage by a probit regression using a dummy
variable as the dependent variable that equals one if the firm is managed by an overconfident
CEO (column 1) or an overconfident CFO (column 2). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered both at the firm and fiscal quarter level to account for non-independent
observations within firms and time. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Reserves)
(1) (2)
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) 0.139
(0.091)
OC (CFO) 0.417∗∗
(0.185)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 420 130
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.276
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Table 6: Robustness: Heckman Selection Model
This table reports results for the first and second stage of a heckman selection model. The
dependent variable in the first stage is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm uses
derivatives and zero otherwise, the dependent variable in the second stage is the coefficient
of variation in the hedge ratio (reserves/prod.) for the last four quarters. The independent
variables in the first stage are the same as in Table 2 except the overconfidence indicators,
the independent variables in the second stage are the same as in Table 2. All variables are
defined in Table 11. Standard errors are based on the two-step variance estimator introduced
by Heckman (1976). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
A. Main (Second Stage) Regression - Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation
OC (CEO) −0.070
(0.043)
OC (CFO) 0.291∗∗∗
(0.055)
Control Variables Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes
(Uncensored) Observations 612
B. First Stage Regression - Dependent Variable: Hedge Indicator
Log(Assets) 0.269∗∗∗
(0.037)
MTB −0.045
(0.041)
Leverage −0.229
(0.278)
Dividends paid (0/1) −0.249∗∗
(0.112)
Z-Score 0.004
(0.006)
ROA 0.002
(0.002)
Quick Ratio −0.061∗∗∗
(0.013)
Delta (CEO) −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Log(Vega(CEO)) −0.015
(0.052)
Delta (CFO) −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)
Log(Vega(CFO)) 0.210∗∗∗
(0.066)
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes
(Censored) Observations 1,803
χ2 163.856
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Table 7: Robustness: Alternative Overconfidence Classifications
This table reports results for OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the coefficient of
variation in the hedge ratio (reserves) for the last four quarters. OC CEO (20%/60%/80%)
and OC CFO (20%/60%/80%) are indicator variables that equal one if the CEO/CFO is
classified as overconfident, i.e. if the CEO/CFO ever held an option until the final maturity
year, which is at least 20%, 60%, or 80% in the money and zero otherwise. The other
independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in Table 11. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered both at the firm and fiscal quarter level
to account for non-independent observations within firms and time. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Reserves)
(1) (2) (3)
A: 20% Threshold
OC (CEO) 0.037
(0.084)
OC (CFO) 0.178∗
(0.098)
B: 60% Threshold
OC (CEO) −0.002
(0.095)
OC (CFO) 0.168∗
(0.088)
C: 80% Threshold
OC (CEO) 0.004
(0.094)
OC (CFO) 0.185∗∗
(0.083)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 633 633 649
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.221 0.220
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Table 8: Robustness: Different Windows
This table reports results for OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the coefficient of
variation in the hedge ratio (reserves) for the last six, eight, and ten fiscal quarters. The
independent variables are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in Table 11. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered both at the firm and fiscal quarter level
to account for non-independent observations within firms and time. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Reserves)
6 qts. 8 qts. 10 qts.
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) −0.019 −0.074 −0.121
(0.084) (0.087) (0.095)
OC (CFO) 0.290∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.119) (0.136)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 630 610 587
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.222 0.229
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Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Measurement of Speculation
This table reports results for an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the speculation
measure proposed by Beber and Fabbri (2012). This measure is computed by estimating a
first stage regression using the hedge ratio (reserves) as the dependent variable and standard
hedging control variables as independent variables. The standard deviation of the residual
of this regression during the tenure of CEO/CFO pairs is used to measure speculation and
is regressed on the same control variables as in Table 2. All variables are defined in Table
11. Standarderrors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account
for non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Residual (Beber and Fabbri (2012))
(1)
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) −0.013
(0.011)
OC (CFO) 0.029∗∗
(0.014)
Observations 61
Adjusted R2 0.076
Control Variables Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes
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Table 10: Robustness: Manager Characteristics
This table reports results for an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the coefficient of
variation in the hedge ratio (reserves) for the last four quarters. The independent variables
are the same as in Table 2 and are defined in Table 11. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered both at the firm and fiscal quarter level to account for non-independent
observations within firms and time. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefficient of Variation in Hedge Ratio (Reserves)
(1)
A: Overconfidence
OC (CEO) 0.067
(0.111)
OC (CFO) 0.254∗∗
(0.099)
B: Other Characteristics
PhD (CEO) 0.094
(0.112)
MBA (CEO) 0.066
(0.199)
MBA (CFO) −0.043
(0.073)
Male (CFO) −0.370∗∗
(0.149)
Age (CEO) −0.002
(0.005)
Age (CFO) −0.006
(0.004)
Control Variables Yes
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 615
Adjusted R2 0.231
93
Table 11: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition and/or Compustat item
Managerial Characteristics (defined for CEO and CFO separately):
Overconfident Equal to one if a manager holds executive stock options until
the last year of maturity that are at least 40% in-the-money
and zero otherwise.
Delta Overall delta of the option and stock portfolio held by a man-
ager divided by total shares outstanding. The individual stock
delta is one per definition, the delta of an individual option is
defined as e−dTN(Z).
Vega e
−dTN
′
(Z)ST 1/2∗(0.01)
SharesOutstanding . In our regressions we use log(1 + vega)
to correct for the skewness of vega.
where:
Z =
[
ln (S/X) + T
(
r − d+ σ2/2)] /σT 1/2
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribu-
tion
N
′ =normal density function.
S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option
r = natural logarithm of the risk-free rate
T = time to maturity of the option in years
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life
of the option
Male A dummy variable, which equals one if the manager is female.
Ph.D. A dummy variable, which equals one if the manager holds a
Ph.D. degree.
MBA A dummy variable, which equals one if the manager holds an
MBA degree.
Age Age of the manager in years at the time of the debt issue.
Company characteristics:
Total Assets Firm’s total book assets in $million in 2011 dollars.
Market-to-Book Market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets.
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition and/or Compustat item
Leverage Long-term debt plus short-term debt plus preferred equity di-
vided by total book assets.
Quick Ratio Cash and short term investments plus receivables divided by
current liabilities.
Z-Score Altman (1968)’s Z-Score.
Return on Assets EBITDA divided by total assets.
Proven & Prob. Reserves Amount of gold that is economically feasible for mining (in
troy oz).
Annual Gold Production Number of ounces of gold produced in the fiscal year (in troy
oz).
Derivative Portfolio Characteristics:
Hedge Ratio Delta of all gold derivatives divided by gold reserves or gold
production.
Coeff. of Variation - HR Standard deviation of the hedge ratio dividided by the mean
of the hedge ratio.
Total CF Cash flow of gold derivatives approximated using the method
by Adam and Fernando (2006).
Benchmark CF Cash flow of gold derivatives that would have realized if the
hedge ratio would have been held constant over the last four
quarters.
Spec. CF Difference of CF from Gold Derivatives and Pred. CF from
Gold Derivatives.
95
Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial
Optimism
Valentin Burg
Abstract:
We analyze the relation between managerial optimism and corporate payout
policy. We predict that optimistic managers perceive their firm’s equity to
be undervalued and therefore prefer share repurchases over dividends when
distributing cash to shareholders. Using data from S&P 1,500 firms between
1992 and 2010, we find that optimistic CEOs engage in more repurchase ac-
tivity when measured as a fraction of total payouts and total assets. We find
no effect of managerial optimism on total payouts. The latter is a surprising
result because existing evidence suggests that optimistic CEOs prefer to fund
investment projects internally - and thus would be expected to retain excess
cash.
Keywords: Manager Characteristics, Optimism, Payout Policy, Share Repur-
chases, Dividends
JEL-Classification: G02, G30, G32, G35
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1 Introduction
Determining corporate payout and dividend policy is among the most
important strategic decisions faced by corporate executives. There is a lively
debate on whether it is optimal to channel excess cash to shareholders via
dividends or via share repurchases, however, there is still no conclusive answer
(Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002)). While existing research mainly focuses on
firm and market characteristics, recent studies show that also managerial traits
strongly shape corporate financial decisions (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). A
widely recognized bias is managerial optimism, which is based on psychological
findings and implies that people tend to think that favorable future events are
more likely than they are in reality.1 Hackbarth (2008) incorporates this bias
in a trade-off model of capital structure. He shows that optimistic managers
are reluctant to raise external funds because they view their company as un-
dervalued and believe that external funds are unduly costly. This finding has
direct implications for corporate payout policy: (i) optimistic managers should
pay out less compared to rational managers in order to have sufficient internal
funds to avoid dependence on costly external capital. (ii) Since optimistic man-
agers perceive their company to be undervalued, buying back the company’s
shares is a positive NPV project for an optimistic manager: Wealth can be
transferred from short-term traders to long-term shareholders (Ikenberry and
Vermaelen (1996)).
Both arguments have an impact on the optimal payout channel design
of a company. While the first argument applies to both dividends and share
repurchases the second argument is only valid for repurchases. If optimistic
managers rely more on internal cash flow they should pay out less dividends.
The effect on share repurchases, however, is less clear: If the perceived benefits
1 Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) shows that miscalibration is widespread among
financial executives. According to their results, financial executives are biased in their
estimation of future events. One possible reason for the bias is executive optimism.
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from market timing are larger than the costs associated with paying out excess
cash, then optimistic managers should use more share repurchases relative to
rational managers and vice versa. However, conditional on paying out cash,
optimistic managers should always rely more on share repurchases.
We study these predictions using a comprehensive dataset covering all
CEOs contained in the ExecuComp database for the time period 1992 to 2010.
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005a), managers are classified as optimistic
if they ever hold an option until maturity which is at least 40% in-the-money
at the year-end prior to maturity. The reasoning behind this methodology is
that executives are typically badly diversified and hence should exercise exec-
utive options as soon as possible to reduce their exposure to firm-specific risk.
Optimism is considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic
of the executive. Controlling for observable firm and manager characteristics,
we find that optimistic CEOs pay out 8-10% more of excess cash in form of
share repurchases compared to rational CEOs. Given the average fraction of
share repurchases over total payouts of 50%, this effect is economically signif-
icant. Disentangling the effects for share repurchases and dividends, we find
that optimistic CEOs also repurchase more shares when measured as a fraction
of total assets. We do not find significant differences between rational and op-
timistic managers for total payouts. Our results also hold when we control for
unobservable firm characteristics that are constant over time. In particular,
we employ a difference-in-difference methodology surrounding CEO turnover
and find that incoming optimistic CEOs engage in more repurchase activity
after being hired.
This paper adds to the ongoing discussion on how managerial biases af-
fect corporate financial policies. We are among the first to analyze the impact
of optimism on payout policy in general and share repurchases in particular.
To the best of our knowledge, two papers analyze the relation between payout
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policy and optimism. We confirm the findings of Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner,
and Nanda (2014) and show that optimistic CEOs prefer repurchases over div-
idends relative to rational CEOs. In addition, we analyze dividend decisions
and mitigate endogeneity concerns by showing that this result holds after ac-
counting for unobservable variables using CEO changes. Deshmukh, Goel, and
Howe (2013) also find that optimistic managers pay lower dividends, which is
consistent with the argument that optimistic managers prefer to retain cash
to finance future investment projects. However, their sample is limited to
1984-1994, a period where share repurchases were of minor importance for
corporations. Therefore the authors focus on the dividend hypothesis. We
contribute to the existing literature by explicitly investigating the interplay
between CEO optimism and the choice between dividends and share repur-
chases, showing that optimistic managers adjust the payout channel towards
a larger fraction of share repurchases to total payouts. We thereby show that
both the internal cash hypothesis (i) and the market timing hypothesis (ii)
impact the payout channel choice by optimistic managers.
The paper is organized as follows. We develop our empirical hypotheses
in section 2. Section 3 describes the data sample and presents summary statis-
tics. Section 4 discusses the results. In section we check results for robustness.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Predictions
Hackbarth (2008) incorporates managerial traits, in particular optimism
and optimism, in a trade-off model of capital structure.2 He shows that opti-
mistic managers are reluctant to raise external funds because they view their
2 Managerial optimism is usually defined as the underestimation of the variance of future
cash flows by the acting manager. Overoptimism is defined as the overestimation of
the mean of future cash flows by the acting manager. In the following we use the term
optimism. However, our prediction apply both to optimistic and overoptimistic managers.
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own company as undervalued and believe that external funds are unduly costly.
These results provide the basis for our empirical predictions.
When a manager perceives his company to be undervalued, the com-
pany’s investment opportunity set is expanded, as repurchases offer an addi-
tional positive NPV project (Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996)). The manager
can use the firm’s resources to benefit from perceived misvaluations and trans-
fer wealth from short-term traders to long-term shareholders of the firm. On
the one hand, optimistic managers perceive their companies to be undervalued
because they systematically overestimate the mean of future cash-flows. As
a consequence, they overestimate the value they can realize via share repur-
chases and may engage in more repurchase activity. On the other hand, an
optimistic manager will be reluctant to issue (in his/her view) overly costly
securities such as debt or equity to fund his investment opportunities and is
therefore expected to retain cash for future investment spending in order to
fund investment projects internally.
Essentially, there are two counterbalancing effects: First, buying back the
company’s shares is perceived as an attractive investment. Second, as op-
timistic managers are reluctant to issue debt or equity securities because of
the perceived undervaluation of these securities, they prefer not to pay out
cash to shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchases. However,
conditional on paying out excess cash via dividends or share repurchases, an
optimistic manager is more likely to buy back shares rather than to pay out
dividends because share repurchases benefit the existing shareholders by ex-
ploiting the perceived mispricing.
Hypothesis 1: Optimistic managers will distribute a higher fraction of
total payouts via share repurchases compared to rational managers.
When measuring share repurchases in absolute terms (e.g. as a fraction
of total assets), it is an empirical question which of the two effects dominates.
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If the effect of the perceived undervaluation of the company’s equity outweighs
the effect of the higher costs to raise external capital, the following hypothesis
holds.
Hypothesis 2a: Optimistic managers will engage in more share repur-
chases compared to rational managers in terms of total assets.
On the other hand, if the manager perceives the cost of raising external
finance higher than the benefit of buying back undervalued equity, it follows:
Hypothesis 2b: Optimistic managers will engage in less share repur-
chases compared to rational managers in terms of total assets.
A prediction about the dividend policy is more straightforward. The first effect
does not apply in this context as dividends are not more attractive when the
company’s stock price is misvalued and firms managed by optimistic managers
are expected to pay less dividends compared to firms managed by rational
managers, also in absolute terms. Thus, we predict analogue to Deshmukh
et al. (2013):
Hypothesis 3: Optimistic managers will distribute a lower amount of
cash dividends compared to rational managers in terms of total assets.
Finally, the question is how the effect of optimism affects total payouts. If
dividends are reduced more heavily than share repurchases are increased, firms
run by optimistic managers will have lower total payouts compared to rational
managers.
Hypothesis 4a: Optimistic managers will pay out less compared to
rational managers.
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If share repurchases are increased more heavily than dividends are decreased,
optimistic managers will even have higher total payouts compared to rational
managers.
Hypothesis 4b: Optimistic managers will pay out more compared to
rational managers.
3 Sample and Variable Description
3.1 Measurement of Optimism
We start by identifying CEOs as either rational or optimistic following
Malmendier and Tate (2005b) and measure optimism based on an executive’s
option exercise behavior. We use ExecuComp to obtain detailed information
on executive stock option grants, the number of exercised options, and option
holdings. We restrict our sample to the 1992 to 2010 period and exclude firms
with SIC codes between 6000-6999 (financial firms). As ExecuComp reports
option exercises only in an aggregated manner, we follow Hall and Liebman
(1998) and apply a first-in-first-out method to compute the option portfolios
of managers in each year.3 We classify executives as optimistic if they ever
hold an option until maturity that is at least 40% in-the-money at the year-end
prior to its maturity.4
The intuition behind this classification into rational or optimistic man-
agers is the following: Executives face a trade-off when they decide whether
they will exercise their options or keep the options with the intention to ex-
ercise them later. If they keep the options, they might be able to purchase
company stock at more favorable conditions in the future. The cost of this
strategy is that the executive exposes himself to idiosyncratic risk. Diversi-
3 See the Appendix 1 in Hall and Liebman (1998) and the general Appendix of this disser-
tation for further details.
4 The 40% threshold is derived following Hall and Murphy (2002) using a constant risk
aversion parameter of 3 and 67% of wealth in the company’s stock.
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fying this exposure is difficult for three reasons: First, executives are legally
prohibited to short sell their company’s equity. Second, a large fraction of an
executive’s personal wealth is tied to their company and therefore diversifica-
tion abilities across other investments are limited. Third, additionally a not
negligible fraction of the executive’s human capital is linked to the company’s
value (Malmendier and Tate (2008)). For these reasons, executives seem to be
under-diversified investors with a large exposure to their company’s value and
risk. Rational executives should therefore exercise their executive stock options
once the options are sufficiently in-the-money. On the other hand, managers
who are overly optimistic and therefore overestimate their company’s future
return are likely to fail to exercise their stock options in these situations.
3.2 Measuring Share Repurchases
Measuring the extent to which a company buys back its own shares can
be done using various data sources. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) test which
measure of share repurchases is the most accurate and suggest using the Com-
pustat item purchases of common and preferred stock adjusted for any decrease
in the redemption value of preferred stock. We follow Banyi et al. (2008) and
use this measure of share repurchases.
3.3 Control Variables
The wide empirical literature on share repurchases and dividends sug-
gests a number of control variables in payout regressions. We control in our
regressions for several variables that are expected to have an influence on the
payout policy of a firm.
Jensen (1986) argues that agency costs are imposed on firms with high
free cash flows because managers in these firms may use the excess cash to fund
suboptimal projects. When a firm has excess cash resources that it does not
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want to retain, it can either distribute its excess cash in the form of dividends or
share repurchases to its shareholders. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006)
argue that free cash flow problems are an important driver for a company’s
dividend policy. While younger firms with fewer internal cash flows and abun-
dant investment opportunities pay few dividends, mature firms with abundant
internal cash and fewer investment opportunities optimally pay higher divi-
dends to avoid investments in pet projects. We control for cash holdings in
our regressions by using the ratio of cash and marketable securities (Compus-
tat item # 1) to total assets (Compustat item # 6). Additionally, we include
the market-to-book ratio ((Compustat item #199 * item #25 + item #10 +
item #181) divided by total assets (item #6)) to control for growth opportu-
nities and the logarithm of total assets (Compustat item #6) to control for
size effects.
When firms buy back their own shares, they reduce the market value of
equity by the repurchased amount and thus increase their leverage. Therefore,
repurchases can be used to adjust their current capital structure (Dittmar
(2000)). Assuming an optimal leverage ratio exists, share repurchases can be
used to increase leverage in order to revert to the optimal capital structure
when the current leverage is below the optimal leverage ratio. Therefore,
we include a variable in our share repurchase regressions that measures the
deviation from the industry median leverage. Leverage is defined as the ratio
of long-term debt (Compustat item #9) to total assets (Compustat item #6).
We expect this variable to be negatively related to share repurchase activity.
The decision to repurchase shares may also be influenced by the threat
of a hostile takeover attempt. Billett and Xue (2007) find a positive relation
between share buybacks and takeover attempts. Share buybacks lead to a
higher acquisition price because the investors that sell their shares in a buyback
are the ones with the lowest reservation price. Companies with a higher risk
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of being target of a takeover attempt are therefore more likely to repurchase
stocks. We include a dummy variable in our regressions that is equal to one
if a company was target of a takeover attempt in the respective year and zero
otherwise. The data is taken from Thomson One Banker.
Companies grant executive stock options to their managers and when
these options are exercised, firms may buy back shares to balance the dilution
effect of the issuance of new securities. Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner (2000)
find supporting evidence for this theory for a sample of large US companies. To
account for the possibility that companies buy back shares to counterbalance
the dilution effect of the issuance of new shares, we follow Kahle (2002) and
use the ExecuComp database to calculate the number of options exercised and
exercisable by all top managers of the firm.
Fenn and Liang (2001) and Babenko (2009) document a relation between
pay-performance sensitivities and share repurchases. In particular, more exec-
utive stock options are associated with more share repurchases and less divi-
dends because stock options do not benefit from dividend payments. We follow
Core and Guay (2002) and compute the delta and vega of a manager’s stock
and stock option portfolio. The delta of the manager’s portfolio is equal to
the sum of the delta of his company stocks plus the overall delta of his option
portfolio. We compute the overall delta of his options following Black and
Scholes (1973) and assume that the delta of each stock is equal to one.5 We
follow Tchistyi, Yermack, and Yun (2011) and scale delta by common shares
outstanding to compute the sensitivity relative to the total market capitaliza-
tion of the firm. For the calculation of the managers’s vega, we only take into
account the vega of his options because the vega for stock is typically very
5 We estimate the one-year stock return volatility using stock price data from CRSP and
use it as a proxy for future volatility. Further, we proxy for the risk-free rate by using the
10-year US-treasury rate from the Federal Reserve.
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close to zero.6 We follow Tchistyi et al. (2011) and use log(1 + vega) in our
regressions in order to account for the fact that vega is skewed.
We winsorize all variables at the one-percent level. For further details on
the variables used, we refer the reader to Table 8.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empir-
ical analysis.
[Table 1 here]
CEO Optimistic is a dummy variable that equals one if the company’s
CEO is classified as optimistic. In 31.8% of all firm-years we classified the
CEO as optimistic and zero otherwise. The average firm pays out about 5.1%
of total assets to shareholders and distributes 50.7% of the payouts in the form
of share repurchases. When looking at the mean value of share repurchases
to total assets and dividends to total assets, we observe that the average firm
pays out 3.5% in form of share repurchases and 1.6% of total assets through
dividends. Total payouts are heavily right skewed as the median firm only
pays out 2.8%.
The average firm has about $5.9 billion total assets. Firm size is also
strongly right-skewed, as the median firm has total assets of about $1.8 billion.
On average a firm has cash holdings of about 11.4% of total assets. Also cash
holdings are strongly right-skewed as the median firm has cash holdings of
about 5% of total assets. The average firm’s market-to-book ratio is about
1.98 while the median firm’s market-to-book ratio is only 1.59. Thus, also for
the firms market-to-book ratio we see positive skewness. The market leverage
6 In theory, the vega of a share could be different from zero. However, Guay (1999) finds
that the mean vega of an executive’s stocks is 0.005. Therefore, we assume the vega of
the stocks in a manager’s portfolio to be zero.
106
is on average about 19%, similar to the leverage ratio of the median firm.
Deviation from optimal leverage is the deviation from the median leverage of
firms that operate in the same industry as the respective firm based on two-
digit SIC codes. Firms in our sample period have about 1% lower leverage
ratios than the industry median. In 3% of firm-years, firms in our sample were
target of a takeover attempt. Delta and Vega of the CEO are the stock and
option portfolio sensitivities with respect to a $1 change in the stock price
(delta) and a 1% change in the stock return’s volatility (vega). The average
CEO in our sample receives about 3% of the market value gain resulting from
a $1 increase in the stock price. The value of his option portfolio increases
by $136,000 following a one-percent increase in the stock returns volatility
(not reported). Options excercised is the number of executive stock options
exercised relative to common shares outstanding.7 Option excercises are only
minor as they solely comprise 0.2% of common shares outstanding on average.
The number of exercisable options is higher as exercisable options account for
1.5% of shares outstandings.
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between the variables used in the
empirical analysis.
[Table 2 here]
We observe that share repurchases over total payouts and share repur-
chases over total assets is significantly positively correlated with CEO opti-
mism. These correlations are statistically significant at the 1-percent level
which is consistent with the hypothesis that optimistic CEOs engage in heav-
ier share repurchase activity because they perceive their company’s equity as
undervalued. Cash dividends over total assets is negatively correlated with
7 For the calculation of the total number of executive stock options exercised we take into
account all executives that are included in the ExecuComp database in a given year.
Usually, these are the five highest ranked executives of a company.
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CEO optimism which is supportive for the hypothesis that optimistic CEOs
pay less dividends. Total payouts to total assets is positively correlated with
CEO optimism suggesting that lower dividend payments by optimistic CEOs
are more than outweighed by higher share repurchase activity.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss univariate and multivariate tests of our hy-
potheses presented in section 2. To analyze the impact of managerial traits on
corporate payout policy we first estimate tobit models to analyze if there is a
difference between our variables of interest between firms that are managed by
optimistic CEOs and firms managed by rational CEOs. In a second step, we
compare CEO changes where the new CEO is optimistic to CEO changes where
the new CEO is rational to control for unobserved firm characteristics that are
constant around the managerial change. We expect optimistic managers to
reorganize the payout channel to a larger fraction of share repurchases.
4.1 Bivariate Analysis
Table 3 presents T-tests for the differences in means of the ratios of
share repurchases to total payouts, repurchases to total assets, dividends to
total assets and total payouts to total assets for firms with optimistic CEOs
and firms with non-optimistic CEOs.
[Table 3 here]
We find that the ratio of share repurchases to total payouts is about 10%
higher for firms with optimistic CEOs compared to firms with rational CEOs.
The difference between these two groups is statistically significant from zero
at the one-percent level. The ratio of share repurchases to total assets is 0.7%
higher in firms with an optimistic CEO. This difference is also significantly
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different from zero at the one-percent level suggesting that optimistic man-
agers do not only reorganize their payouts towards share repurchases but also
increase share repurchases in total amounts. The ratio of cash dividends to
total assets is about 0.2% lower for optimistic CEOs, while the ratio of total
payouts to total assets is 0.5% higher for firms with optimistic CEOs. These
two differences are also statistically different from zero at the one-percent level.
Overall, the bivariate tests suggest that firms with optimistic CEOs distribute
cash to shareholders in different ways compared to firms with non-optimistic
CEOs. Firms with optimistic CEOs buy back more shares and pay less divi-
dends. Total payouts are - at least in the bivariate tests - higher for firms with
optimistic CEOs relative to firms with non-optimistic CEOs. The results in
Table 3 are consistent with hypothesis 1, 2a, 3, and 4b.
4.2 Multivariate Results
To test our hypotheses, we employ a tobit regression framework regress-
ing the different payout ratios on a dummy (OCi) that equals one if the CEO
of firm i is classified as optimistic:8
Payout ratioi,t = α + αInd + αt + β1 ∗OCi,t + β2 ∗Xi,t + ϵi,t
αInd and αY ear are industry and year dummies.9 We use firm- and manager-
specific control variables Xi as described in Section 3.3. Standard errors are
clustered on the firm level. Results are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 here]
8 Results remain unaffected if we use OLS regressions instead of Tobit and are very similar
in both economic and statistical significance.
9 In all regressions, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and include industry dummies for
the following industries: Agricultural Production (SIC 100), Technical (SIC 1000-1799,
8711), Manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999), Transportation (SIC 4000-4899), Trade (5000-
5999), and Service (SIC 7000-8710, 8712-8720, 8722-8999).
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In the first two models, we find support for our first hypothesis that
optimistic CEOs distribute more cash to shareholders in the form of share
repurchases. Firms with optimistic CEOs distribute 7.9% more of total payouts
in the form of share repurchases when controlling for several firm and manager
characteristics as well as time and industry effects. The result is statistically
significant at the one-percent level. The signs of the other coefficients are as
expected: Larger firms buy back less shares and firms with higher cash holdings
pay out more in form of share repurchases. In addition, CEOs with large option
holdings and firms that have a large number of exercisable executive stock
options outstanding (or exercised stock options) engage in more repurchases.
The coefficient for M&A targets is significantly negative which is puzzling. The
negative coefficient means that firms that were target of a takeover attempt
decrease their fraction of share repurchases. However, theory predicts that
these firms should increase the amount of share repurchases to increase the
takeover premium.
Next, we test if optimistic CEOs pay out more in form of share repur-
chases when measured as a fraction of total assets.10 We find supporting
evidence that firms with optimistic CEOs buy back more shares. The average
firm that has an optimistic CEO repurchases 0.7% more shares than an oth-
erwise identical firm with a non-optimistic CEOs, when share repurchases are
measured as a fraction of total assets. This result is statistically significant at
the one-percent level. The result is also economically significant: On average,
firms with optimistic CEOs pay out about $41mn more (in terms of median
total assets: $11.5mn) in form of share repurchases compared to firms with
non-optimistic CEOs. The coefficients of the other control variables in model
(4) are similar to the results in model (2). Additionally, we find significant co-
10We run the regressions additionally with share repurchases scaled by the market value of
equity. Results are qualitatively the same.
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efficients for the market-to-book ratio (positive) and the deviation from target
leverage (negative), which is in line with prior literature (Dittmar (2000)).
In models (5) and (6) we analyze - analogue to Deshmukh et al. (2013)
- if firms with optimistic CEOs pay less cash dividends. Although we find
a negative coefficient for CEO optimism in both models, the coefficient is
statistically insignificant. The other coefficients are in line with findings in the
prior literature: Larger firms pay more dividends while firms that compensate
their executive with large option packages pay less dividends. It has to be
noted that our findings are contrary to Deshmukh et al. (2013). This could
be explained by the different sample and sample period.11 However, it has to
be noted that our results are qualitatively similar to the results in Deshmukh
et al. (2013).
Lastly, in models (7) and (8), we analyze how total payouts scaled by
total assets differ between firms with optimistic CEOs and firms with non-
optimistic CEOs. We find no effect for the optimism dummy on the level of
total payouts. This finding is in line with Deshmukh et al. (2013). Further,
we find that firms with more cash, a higher market-to-book ratio and with
more option based compensation pay out more, while firms that are below
their target leverage and firms with higher stock compensation measured by
the delta of the CEO pay out less.
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with hypothesis 1 and hy-
pothesis 2a.
11 In their analysis, Deshmukh et al. (2013) use data from the 1980s and early 1990s. In
this time period, cash dividends were the dominant payout source. This has changed in
the last twenty years when share repurchases became more dominant. See for example
Dittmar (2000).
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4.3 CEO Turnover Analysis
To control for unobserved firm characteristics that may impact the de-
cision to buy back shares and are correlated with optimism at the same time,
we test whether the payout policy changes after managerial turnover for dif-
ferent types of incoming CEOs. Since changes in a firm’s payout policy are
not likely to materialize "overnight", we require a minimum of 7 years of data
on the firm’s total payout and share repurchase volume surrounding the CEO
turnover (i.e., three years before and three years after the CEO turnover). This
gives sufficient time to implement changes by the incoming CEO and allows for
a potential behavioral bias to manifest. Therefore, we drop all turnover where
we have not the complete seven year period in Compustat or ExecuComp.
Further, our sample is reduced because of missing data for share repurchases,
cash dividends, and the other control variables (section 3.3) necessary in our
regressions and we end up with 619 CEO changes.
Since we intend to analyze the effect of CEO optimism on the firm’s
payout- and share repurchase activity, we require at a minimum that the suc-
cessor can be classified as rational or optimistic by our classification algorithm
above (section 3.1). We were not able to classify the successor in 278 cases.
Thus we are left with a set of 341 CEO changes. In 116 cases we were also able
to classify the predecessor, in 225 we were not able to classify the predecessor.
In detail we have the following groups of CEO turnover:
1. predecessor was rational → successor was rational (58 observations)
2. predecessor was optimistic → successor was rational (26 observations)
3. predecessor was unknown → successor was rational (159 observations)
4. predecessor was optimistic → successor was optimistic (25 observations)
5. predecessor was unknown → successor was optimistic (66 observations)
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6. predecessor was rational → successor was optimistic (7 observations)
Since we want to infer the impact of the incoming CEO’s managerial
trait on the firm’s payout- and share repurchase activity, we combine group 2
& 3 (rational incoming CEO) and compare them to groups 5 & 6 (optimistic
incoming CEO). We do not include groups were the predecessor and successor
were of the same type. Imposing no restrictions on the predecessor thereby
is conservative as it introduces noise that, if anything, would diminish our
findings.
The tests are based on a difference-in-difference methodology. The pro-
cedure is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
In particular, we are looking at the seven year window surrounding the
turnover event. We calculate averages of the different payout ratios three
years before and after the turnover and compute the difference between these
averages. Lastly, we analyze if these difference vary for CEO changes where
the new CEO is optimistic relative to CEO changes where the incoming CEO
is non-optimistic.
Figure 2 presents the mean values of the variables of interest for the years
[-3,+3] around CEO turnover.
[Figure 2 here]
In Panel A, we see - consistent with our first hypothesis - that the frac-
tion of share repurchases to total payouts increases after CEO turnover with
optimistic successors while the opposite is true for turnover with rational suc-
cessors. The evidence for total payouts in panel B is less clear: While the
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level is different before the turnover, total payouts increase slightly after an
optimistic CEO is hired, while payouts decrease after the hiring of a rational
manager. In Panel C, we observe that the total level of share repurchases -
when measured in terms of total assets - increases after the hiring of an opti-
mistic manager, while it decreases when a rational manager is hired. However,
in year 3 after the turnover this pattern reverses. In Panel D, the evolution of
dividends after CEO turnover is shown. Dividends seem to be unaffected by
the type of the new CEO. The graphical evidence presented in Figure 2 is con-
sistent with hypothesis 1 and 2a. It seems that optimistic managers increase
the level of share repurchases both in terms of total payouts and total assets
after being hired. There is no clear pattern in total payouts over total assets.
Dividend payments seem to be unaffected by the new manager type.
To test the hypotheses, we employ the following regression framework:
∆PayoutRatioi,t = α + αInd + αt + β1 ∗OCi,t + β2 ∗Xi,t + ϵi,t
αInd and αY ear are industry and year dummies. We use the same firm- and
manager-specific control variables Xi as in Table 4. Xit includes both the mean
of the respective control variables before and after the CEO changes as well
as changes in these means to control for a potential change in other factors
impacting payout decisions. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level.
Results are reported in Table 5.
[Table 5 here]
The results in Table 5 confirm our previous findings: The pre-turnover
to post-turnover change in the fraction of share repurchases to total payouts
is significantly higher if the successor is classified as optimistic. In unreported
results, we find that firms with higher market-to-book ratios, firms where the
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CEO’s vega is higher, and firms with more executive options outstanding in-
crease the share repurchase fraction after the turnover to a greater extent.
Looking at the changes of the variables we find that a larger increase in asset
size is negatively related to the fraction of payouts distributed as share repur-
chases which is consistent with the idea that larger firms pay more dividends.
To test if optimistic managers increase the amount of share repurchases not
only relative to rational managers but also overall, we test the null hypothesis
that the sum of the constant term and the optimism coefficient is equal to
zero with a F-test (not reported). We can reject the null hypothesis at the
one-percent level, suggesting that optimistic managers increase the fraction
of payouts that is paid in form of share repurchases after being hired. Over-
all, we find strong support for our main hypothesis that optimistic managers
reorganize the payout channel to a larger fraction of share repurchases.
The results in Table 5 (models (3) and (4)) suggest that optimistic man-
agers also increase the total amount of share repurchases when measured in
terms of total assets after being hired. We find that optimistic managers
increase share repurchases by about one percentage point. The result is statis-
tically significant at the ten percent level. When looking at the other control
variables (not reported in the table) we observe that firms with more cash, firms
with higher market-to-book ratios, firms with CEOs that have higher vegas,
and firms with more executive stock options outstanding in the pre-turnover
period increase share repurchases. The change in total assets between the post-
and pre-turnover period is negatively related with share repurchases while the
change in vega and the market-to-book ratio is positively related to the total
amount of share repurchases.
In the models (5) and (6), the effect of optimism on dividends is analyzed.
The effect is insignificant, confirming our results in Section 4.2. The effect of
the other control variables shows that firms with higher market-to-book ratios
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and firms with higher CEO deltas more often increase their dividend payout.
Firms with strong asset growth between the two periods pay less dividends, and
firms with higher market-to-book ratios and higher vegas in the post-turnover
period pay more dividends.
In models (7) and (8) we regress the change in total payouts on opti-
mism of the incoming CEO. Again, we find no significant relation between
CEO optimism and total payouts suggesting that optimistic managers reorga-
nize the payout channel to a higher share repurchases fraction while the change
in overall payouts is not significantly different for a CEO turnover with an op-
timistic successor compared to a turnover with a rational successor. Turning
to the control variables we find that firms with higher market-to-book ratios
and with CEOs with higher vegas increase payouts and firms where the man-
agement owns more exercisable options decrease the payout ratio. Also, firms
with a larger increase in size decrease payouts while firms with larger increases
in the market-to-book ratio and the CEO’s vega increase payouts.
5 Robustness
5.1 Alternative Measures of Optimism
We test our results for robustness with respect to different optimism
measures in Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
In particular, we consider different moneyness thresholds for the origi-
nal Malmendier and Tate (2005a) classification, we distinguish between Pre-
and Post-optimistic and use alternative methods to identify optimism. Table
6 replicates model 2 of Table 4 using these alternative classification methods.
We start by identifying CEOs as optimistic if they ever hold an option until
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one year prior to expiration which is at least 70% (model 1) or 100% (model 2)
in-the-money whereas the original classification uses a threshold of 40% mon-
eyness. We find that our results are robust to different moneyness thresholds:
Results are even stronger if the moneyness threshold is higher. In particular,
if we use a 70% (100%) threshold, firms with optimistic CEOs distribute 8%
(10%) more of their payouts in the form of share repurchases (compared to dif-
ference of 7.8% with a threshold of 40%). Results are statistically significant
at the one percent level. Thus, our results are robust to different moneyness
thresholds used to identify managers as optimistic.
Second, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and use the point in time
when a manager showed optimistic behavior for the first time to distinguish
between Pre- and Post-optimistic. By doing this we check whether optimism
can be treated as a time-invariant personal characteristic. Pre-optimistic is a
dummy variable equal to one during the time period before the manager held
options until maturity for the first time. Post-optimistic is a dummy equal to
one thereafter. We find in model 3 that firms with optimistic CEOs pay out
significantly more in form of share repurchases confirming our previous results
and supporting the notion that optimism is a time-invariant characteristic.
Third, we use the Holder67 measure proposed by Malmendier and Tate
(2005a). This measure classifies CEOs as optimistic if they hold options that
are at least 67% in-the-money five years after they have been granted to the
manager. A manager needs to show this behavior at least twice during his/her
tenure. Our results are economically weaker using this measure but still sta-
tistically significant at the ten percent level.
Lastly, we use the method proposed by Sen and Tumarkin (2009). This
method relies on the managers’ stock holdings and identifies managers as opti-
mistic if their stock holdings relative to their salaries exceed the median stock
holdings to salary ratio in the industry. The intuition behind this method is
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identical to the method introduced by Malmendier and Tate (2005a). Execu-
tives are typically poorly diversified and the reason for keeping high exposures
to a manager’s firm is likely to be optimism.12 In model 5 we show that our
results hold when using the method proposed by Sen and Tumarkin (2009).
5.2 Other Managerial Characteristics
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that managerial style affects various
corporate financial policies. In particular, they show that manager fixed effects
are important in explaining policies such as corporate investment. Following
this research, a number of studies relates corporate policies to specific man-
ager characteristics such as age or gender. For example, Huang and Kisgen
(2013) show that male managers pursue risker financing decisions. To rule
out that optimism may be correlated with other CEO characteristics that also
potentially affect payout decisions, we test our results for robustness in Table
7.
[Table 7 here]
The effect of optimism on share repurchases prevails after including other
personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that besides optimism especially
younger CEOs and CEOs with a PhD use share repurchases as payout channel.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of managerial optimism on corporate
payout policy. We investigate if companies with optimistic CEOs prefer share
repurchases over dividends when paying out excess resources to shareholders.
Optimistic managers overestimate their own abilities in managing the firm and
12The ratio with respect to salary is used because Core and Guay (2002) show that many
firms use minimum stock holdings requirements for their managers that are stated in
terms of salary.
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thereby overestimate the value of the firm compared to the market. This makes
share repurchases a more attractive payout channel relative to dividends. With
share repurchases, a manager can benefit from mispricings and transfer wealth
from short-term traders to long-term shareholders. However, there is a coun-
terbalancing effect of optimism on share repurchases and on payout policy in
particular. Because optimistic managers are reluctant to issue debt or equity
because they perceive it as unduly costly, optimistic managers might pay out
less in order to finance future investment projects internally. This would pre-
dict a negative influence of optimism on total payouts.
We analyze a sample of S&P 1,500 firms between 1992 and 2010 and find
that optimistic managers engage in more repurchase activity when measured
as a fraction of total payouts and of total assets. We find no effect of opti-
mism on dividends and total payouts. Our findings are robust to unobserved,
time invariant firm characteristics that might be correlated with optimism and
payouts at the same time.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure 1: Difference-in-Difference around CEO Turnover
We analyze the payout policy around CEO changes to identify the effect of CEO optimism
on payout policy. We measure average payout ratios in the three years before and after the
turnover event and analyze if the difference-in-difference varies for the type of the new CEO.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Payout Components Following CEO Turnover
This figure shows the average reaction of share repurchases to total payouts (Panel A), total
payouts to total assets (Panel B), share repurchases to total assets (Panel C), and cash
dividends to total assets (Panel D) following a CEO turnover. The event window has a
length of seven years, year 0 is the year of the turnover. Variable definitions are given in
Table 8.
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A.2 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
In this table, summary statistics are reported for a sample of 1313 firms between 1992 and
2010. Variable definitions are provided in Table 8. All variables are winsorized at the
one-percent level at both ends of the distribution except the logarithm of vega.
Summary statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max Obs
CEO optimistic 0.318 0.000 0.466 0.00 1.00 10,378
Repurchases over Total Pay-
outs
0.507 0.551 0.411 0.00 1.00 10,378
Tot. Payouts over Total As-
sets
0.051 0.028 0.063 0.00 0.34 10,378
Repurchases over Total As-
sets
0.035 0.010 0.056 0.00 0.28 10,378
Dividends over Total Assets 0.016 0.011 0.019 0.00 0.11 10,378
Total Assets (in bn USD) 5.866 1.752 10.512 0.02 56.13 10,378
Cash Holdings 0.114 0.050 0.146 0.00 0.78 10,378
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.971 1.590 1.216 0.72 9.47 10,378
Market Leverage 0.194 0.187 0.152 0.00 0.80 10,378
Dev. from Target Leverage -0.009 -0.026 0.136 -0.43 1.42 10,378
M&A Target 0.033 0.000 0.178 0.00 1.00 10,378
Delta (CEO) 0.029 0.012 0.045 0.00 0.21 10,378
Log(1 + Vega) (CEO) 4.116 4.235 1.661 0.00 9.25 10,378
Exec. Options Exercised 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.00 0.03 10,378
Exec. Options Exercisable 0.015 0.008 0.023 0.00 0.23 10,378
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Table 3: T-Tests - Differences in Payout Variables
This table reports T-tests for the differences in means between the mean-levels of payout
variables for optimistic and rational CEOs. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All variable
definitions are given in the Appendix (Table 8). *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%,5%,1% level.
Optimistic
0 1 Diff. in
Means
Repurchases over total payouts 0.474 0.577 −0.103∗∗∗
(0.009)
Repurchases over total assets 0.033 0.039 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
Dividends over total assets 0.016 0.014 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Tot. payouts over total assets 0.050 0.055 −0.005∗∗∗
Observations 7,088 3,305
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Table 6: Alternative Optimism Classifications
This table reports tobit regressions using the ratio of share repurchases over total payouts as
the dependent variable. Optimistic 70 and Optimistic 100 are indicator variables that equal
one if the CEO is classified as optimistic, i.e. if the CEO ever held an option until the final
maturity year, which is at least 70 or 100% in the money and zero otherwise. Holder67 is an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the CEO did not exercise options that were at least
67% in the money in their fifth year at least twice during his/her tenure. Pre-Optimistic
and Post-Optimistic indicate the time period before a CEO ever held an option until the
final maturity year, which is at least 40% in the money and the the time period after this
activity, respectively. Voluntary Holder is an indicator variable that equals one if CEOs
voluntarily hold more stocks of their company than required by company constitutions. The
regressions furthermore include all control variables used in Table 4. All other variables are
defined in Table 8. The regressions include time and industry dummies. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent
observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Optimistic (70) 0.081∗∗∗
(0.026)
Optimistic (100) 0.103∗∗∗
(0.028)
Pre-Optimistic 0.066∗∗
(0.029)
Post-Optimistic 0.070∗∗
(0.029)
Holder 67 0.039∗
(0.020)
Voluntary Holder 0.026∗
(0.014)
Observations 10,393 10,393 10,369 6,086 17,525
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.133 0.136 0.146 0.147
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: CEO Characteristics
This table reports tobit regressions using the ratio of share repurchases over total payouts
as the dependent variable. Optimistic is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO
is classified as optimistic, i.e. if the CEO ever held an option until the final maturity year,
which is at least 40% in the money and zero otherwise. Female is a dummy variable that
is equal to one if the CEO is female. Ph.D. is a dummy variable if the CEO holds a Ph.D.
degree. Age is the age of the CEO. Delta measures the sensitivity of the CEO’s overall
option and stock portfolio to price movements of the company’s stock. Log(Vega) measures
the sensitivity of the CEO’s overall option and stock portfolio to volatility changes of the
company’s stock. The regressions furthermore include all control variables used in Table 4.
All variables are defined in table 8. The regressions include time and industry dummies.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for
non-independent observations within firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1)
Optimistic 0.079∗∗∗
(0.025)
Age −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
Female 0.058
(0.055)
Ph.D. 0.171∗∗∗
(0.049)
Delta 0.559∗∗
(0.238)
Log(Vega) 0.048∗∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 8,389
Pseudo R2 0.151
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
Control Variables Yes
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Table 8: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition and/or Compustat item
CEO characteristics and portfolio sensitivities:
Optimistic Equal to one if a manager holds executive stock options
until the last year of maturity that are at least 40%
in-the-money.
Option Value
[
Se−dtN(Z)−Xe−rtN(Z − σT 1/2)]
where:
Z =
[
ln (S/X) + T
(
r − d+ σ2/2)] /σT 1/2
N = cumulative probability function for the normal dis-
tribution
S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the
option
r = natural logarithm of the risk-free rate
T = time to maturity of the option in years
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over
the life of the option
Delta Overall delta of the option and stock portfolio held by
the CEO divided by total shares outstanding. The indi-
vidual stock delta is one per definition, the delta of an
individual option is defined as e−dTN(Z).
Vega e−dTN ′(Z)ST 1/2 ∗ (0.01)
where N ′ =normal density function.
Firm characteristics - Compustat:
Shares repurchased (in USD) Purchase of common and preferred stock (Item #115)
- change in redemption value of preferred stock (Item
#57).
Repurchase to total payouts Shares repurchased (in USD) divided by total payouts
(Item #115 minus ∆(Item #57) plus Item #127).
Repurchase to total assets Shares repurchased (in USD) divided by total assets
(Item #6).
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition and/or Compustat item
Dividends to total assets Cash dividends (Item #127) divided by total assets
(Item #6).
Total payouts to total assets Total payouts (Item #115 minus ∆(Item #57) plus
Item#127) divided by total assets (Item #6).
Total assets Item #6.
Firm size log(Total assets).
Leverage Long-term debt (Item #9) divided by total assets (Item
#6).
Market-to-book ratio Market value of the firm (Item #199 * Item #25 + Item
#10 + Item #181) divided by total assets (Item #6).
Market value of equity (Item #199 * Item #25 + Item #10).
Cash Cash and marketable securities (Item #1) to total assets
(Item #6).
Other firm characteristics:
Options exercised Total number of options exercised (Execucomp variable
OPT_ EXER_NUM) per company divided by common
shares outstanding.
M&A target Dummy variable equal to one if the company was tar-
get of a takeover attempt in the respective year. Data
source: Thomson One Banker
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Appendix
A Optimism Classification
We follow Malmendier and Tate (2005) and classify executives as opti-
mistic if they ever hold an option until one year before expiration even though
the option is at least 40% in the money. Therefore, to identify executives as
optimistic we need detailed information about the portfolio of executive stock
option holdings for each executive at different points in time. Before 2006,
ExecuComp contains information on option holdings only in an aggregated
form and not detailed for each position of the option portfolio. Therefore, we
use information on option grants and option exercises in order to infer detailed
information on option portfolios including time to maturity and strike price.
Option grants are provided in a detailed manner in the ExecuComp tables
STGRTTAB and PLANBASEDAWARDS. Option exercises are given in an
aggregated form in the table ANNCOMP. Thus, ExecuComp does only state
how many options were exercised but not from which option grant. There-
fore, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and assume a first-in first-out (fifo)
allocation rule in order to infer the option holdings per year.
In doing so, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and make the following
assumptions:
1. Missing information on option grants.
For each option grant we require the number of options granted, the ex-
piration date and the exercise price. Information on option grants is given in
the ExecuComp tables STGRTTAB (until 2006) and PLANBASEDAWARDS
(from 2006 onwards). Information on the expiration date of the grant is con-
tained in the table OUTSTANDINGAWARDS. When exercise dates are miss-
ing, we assume that the option expires ten years after the grant date as the
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median maturity for all option grants is ten years. When the grant date is
missing, we assume that the options are granted at fiscal year end. When the
exercise price is missing, we assume that the options are granted at the money
and thus replace missing exercise prices with the stock price of the company
at the grant date.1
2. Inconsistencies in granted options between PLANBASED-
AWARDS, STGRTTAB and ANNCOMP
We compare whether the number of options granted reported in the ta-
bles STGRTTAB and PLANBASEDAWARDS matches with the information
given in the annual compensation table ANNCOMP. In approximately 95%
of observations this is the case. For the remaining observations only general
information on granted options is given in ANNCOMP but no detailed infor-
mation is available in STGRTTAB or PLANBASEDAWARDS. In these cases,
we assume that the options are granted in a single grant at the money at fiscal
year end.
3. Missing years in compensation reporting
We check whether there are missing years in the compensation reporting
for managers in ExecuComp (for example if compensation is reported for a
manager in 1994 and 1996 but not in 1995). If this is the case, we do not
know how many options were granted or exercised in the missing years and we
only observe the total number of options held in the year following the missing
years. When there is only a gap of one year, the missing information can be
obtained by comparing the option holdings of the year before the gap and the
year following the gap. When the number of options held is larger in the year
following the gap we assume that the additional options are granted in a single
1 The stock price at the grant date is included in the ExecuComp database as the variable
"mktpric". If this variable is not available we use instead the CRSP stock price of the
company at the grant date.
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grant at the money at fiscal year end of the missing year. When the number
of options in the following year is smaller than in the year before the gap, we
assume that the difference is exercised in the missing year. Thereby we apply
the first-in first-out principle and assume that the oldest options are exercised
first.
4. Initial option holdings
ExecuComp contains data on executive compensation starting in 1992.
We follow Hall and Murphy (2002) and restrict our sample to managers that
are included in ExecuComp ten years after ExecuComp’s initial year, that
is, 2002, and the years thereafter. This ensures that we can backtrack option
grants and exercises for managers for a sufficient period of time. The reasoning
behind this is that executive stock options typically have a maturity of ten
years and including only executives in 2002 or thereafter makes sure that the
option portfolios that we compute using the fifo technique are not biased by
imposing too many assumptions on initial option holdings. Hereby, we ensure
that the option portfolios we analyze include reliable information on maturity
and strike price.
However, also managers that appear in ExecuComp for the first time
after 2002 sometimes already have initial stock option holdings for which we
do not have information on the strike price and the maturity. We follow Hall
and Liebman (1998) and assume that these options are granted three years
earlier and have seven years left until expiration (i.e., they are granted with
a ten year maturity). We further assume that the options are granted at the
money at fiscal year end.
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5. Inconsistencies in option holdings between fifo-algorithm and
ANNCOMP
Sometimes the fifo-algorithm results in a different number of options held
by the executive than the number reported in the annual compensation table
ANNCOMP. If this is the case, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and impose
the following assumptions to the option holdings. (i) When the number of
options held by the executive given in ANNCOMP is smaller than the num-
ber computed by the fifo-algorithm, we assume that either some exercises are
missing in ExecuComp or that some options expired. Therefore, we subtract
the difference from the oldest option grants. (ii) When the number of options
held given in ANNCOMP is larger than the number computed by the fifo-
algorithm, we assume that too many options were exercised and add back the
exercised options until both numbers match. If it is insufficient to add back
the exercised options to reach the number reported in ANNCOMP, the option
holdings are rescaled proportionally such that they match with the number of
options held given in ANNCOMP.
6. Adjustment for stock splits
The number of options held and the exercise price need to be adjusted for
stock splits. We obtain information on stock splits directly from ExecuComp.
When this information is missing we assume that there is no stock split in the
given year.
7. Chance to reveal optimism
As discussed above, an executive needs to hold options until one year
before expiration in order to be classified as optimistic. If ExecuComp does
not cover this time period or if the manager leaves the firm before, there is no
chance that optimism can be identified. Therefore, we exclude all executives
that have no chance to reveal themselves as being optimistic.
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